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PEACEKEEPING AND FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: VENEZUELAN ARMED FORCES
POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION USING THE NATIONAL GUARD

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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M.A., Indiana State University, Indiana, 1994

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

PEACEKEEPING AND FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
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composure, professionalism, and devotion while being as helpful as he could be right from the beginning, not only with me but with my wife and children.

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PREFACE

Preparing this thesis, which is one of the most significant requirements for a degree in Military Art and Science, Strategic Planning, has been a painstaking and arduous task, especially, since English is my second language. Although it has not been the first time I have undertaken this kind of commitment, this project means a lot to me. It has provided me with a seemingly ample opportunity to express myself through laughter, frustration, exaltation, and unending written and rewritten words. Indeed, I have been thoroughly challenged, and I am proud and satisfied with my efforts and, most of all, with my project's outcome.

Through the course, I have often questioned if pursuing another master's degree is a worthy goal rather than having more free time to enjoy "the Best Year of my Life" here in Leavenworth. However, this additional academic obstacle has greatly contributed to my self-improvement ideals and determination to take the best from the new academic experience provided by the Command and General Staff College (CGSC).

By undertaking this additional challenge, I have been fortunate in meeting rather unique people. There have also been other intellectual rewards. My committee chairman, advisors, tutors, and classmates are distinguished and highly professional scholars and better human beings. I was also exposed to an environment that really fascinates me: international relations and its military and political implications.

Getting acquainted with today's "new world order" or disorder (like several authors defined it), through the blessing of reading great pieces of literature, attending conferences,

listening to very distinguished guest speakers, and interviewing people occupying key positions (domestic and international) is certainly one of the best academic experiences that I have ever had. As a result, I truly feel that I am now, although naïve perhaps in some areas, somebody who has an overall understanding of what “peacekeeping is all about.”

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In light of the unprecedented and uncertain upheaval spreading throughout the “new world order,” there will be new and more extensive requirements for peacekeeping operations in the twenty-first century. What contribution, and to what extent, could the Venezuelan Armed Forces provide to these new international commitments, especially, when deploying its unique National Guard? A workable approach to addressing this question is to discuss the current events worldwide and then narrow the focus to discuss events from Venezuela’s viewpoint. Also, an analysis must be made of the peculiarities of Venezuela’s Armed Forces, emphasizing the National Guard’s organization, missions, and functions. Note, that it is quite significant to answer the following questions: What is occurring internationally? What is the world’s approach toward peacekeeping? What is the current trend in this issue? Are there any lessons learned? And, finally, an analysis must be made of the potentials and limitations of organizations like the National Guard of Venezuela in joining with the international community to mitigate today’s calamities.

An Overview of the “New World Order”

The demise of the Soviet Union resulted in the loosening of the bonds of restraint in the international system. Coupled with that fact, increased terrorism, narcotic trafficking, famine, natural and man-made disasters, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), border disputes, ethnic conflicts, hatred, and the appearance of new players (national, transnational, and

substate actors) make it necessary for the international community to rely even more on interdependency and collective security efforts in order to assure credible means of confronting today's unrest.

One consequence of the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia, among others, is that the number of nations-states in the United Nations (UN) has grown from around 150 in 1989 to over 180 now. Each new nation-state places demands on the international community concerning its own particular set of national interests. Such interests range from financial assistance to military intervention to enabling governments to ensure domestic political stability.

Samuel Huntington, in his article, "The Clash of Civilizations," feels that because of the increase of new forces and players, the new world order will be more likely to encourage interdependency among nations, especially in the international security environment which will have to cope with any adverse effects. In addition, he asserts that wars will shift from conventional to what is now known as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).¹

Societal clashes and new and old conflicts are becoming more cruel and more intense. There is an increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. It is believed that economic hardships, especially in former Soviet countries, might force those countries to extract any sort of profit from such technology. Along these lines, the eventual use and current production of chemical and biological weapons, such as chlorine gas, despite being banned by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, continues.² This poison gas was first used by Germany against allied troops during World War I. Recently, a Bosnian Muslim journalist wrote that Muslims had produced 120 millimeter of chlorine-filled mortar rounds in the industrial city of Tuzla, which is now headquarters for US peacekeeping units in Bosnia. It is believed that some of the rounds were fired during the Bosnian war. There also continues to be warnings that some former Yugoslavia nation-states have capabilities to

manufacture and possibly market several kinds of chemical munitions or mines. The bottom line is that weapons of mass destruction continue to be an issue of great concern in the international community.

In another instance, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report points out that the Ukraine sold missiles to Libya. It is believed that this allegedly “terrorist supporting country” is getting short-range ballistic missiles and is servicing its Russian-made submarines from Keiv. By procuring this arsenal, Libya may continue being an impediment to regional stability, thereupon jeopardizing global interests in this matter, not to mention the clouds it imposes over Ukrainian-US relations.³

Similarly, famine and its pervasive effects continues as a constant player in the international arena. More likely than not, extreme scarcity of food results from the aftermath of domestic or international wars, extreme poverty, natural or man-made disasters, and critical social imbalance. In Somalia, for example, where famine was caused by political and social imbalances, intervention was prompted by intense international media coverage. And, almost everywhere on the planet (Somalia, Cuba, Haiti, Rwanda, Kurdistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, and more recently, Zaire) refugees are appealing for international help. Reportedly, in November 1996, in the Zaire refugees crisis, hundred of thousands of Rwandan refugees were perishing daily for lack of food and medicine. Avoiding the suffering and death inflicted by a bloody civil war, people desperately fled their country, only to find other, even more enduring threats (lack of food, water, and medicine).⁴ The international community mobilized resources to help to alleviate the people’s problems as much as possible. As may be figured, providing humanitarian aid to such large numbers of refugees strains human and material resources, not to mention causing implicit worldwide restlessness.

The reemergence of and increase in terrorist acts should not be left out. Terrorism is an effective, relatively inexpensive, and pervasive means of getting a message across. Recent examples include the bombings of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the New York Trade Center, and the American Compound in Saudi Arabia. The chemical poisoning of a subway station in Tokyo, the bombing at the Olympics in Atlanta, and the constant bombing of the Colombia Republic's oil pipelines, and analogous attacks around the world are also examples of current terrorist acts. More recently, on December 17, 1996, the terrorist movement Tupac Amaru, of Peru, devastated once again the diplomatic and international community. While a national holiday celebration was being held in the Japanese Embassy in Lima, a team of fourteen individuals belonging to the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, disguised as waiters, assaulted the official residency. They took over four hundred hostages, among which diplomatic representatives comprised the majority. In the following days, the insurgents liberated a great amount of hostages, but retained at least seventy-four people until Peruvian assault forces liberated them in April 1997. Their principal demand had been for President Fujimori and leaders of other states, to immediately free their comrades detained in Peruvian prisons.

Elsewhere, major nuclear powers have begun to negotiate arms-reduction agreements. Yet, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to increase, and conventional arms continue to be amassed in many sites of the world. Now through the Chemical Weapon Convention, nations restlessly struggle to control the development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling or retention of chemical weapons. The proliferation of such devastating weapons and their potential use by extremists has raised fears all over the world.

As presented in the Second Annual Regional Strategic Study Conference held at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), insurgency is seen as a notoriously dangerous threat that is making a strong reappearance in several locations. For example, merciless

guerrillas in Cambodia are spreading death and suffering around the country; Sri Lankan insurgents are causing similar destruction and anguish; cruelty and banditry are blamed on Algerian dissidents; also the Zapatista (indigenous) movement in the Chiapas territory destabilized the Mexican government; and the long-active Colombian guerrillas frequently conduct ambushes and swift attacks against military units and posts, causing hundreds of killings and destroying key oil facilities.⁵

Other factors and players have also impacted the order of things, thus framing the fate of foreign policy. In Africa, for example, Apartheid has been formally dismantled, but new racial tensions are rising in forms of violence. Life expectancy over the globe is also being altered by technological advances. And, as a result of the revolution in communications (satellites, the Internet, TV, and so on), people's awareness of very sensitive themes, such as injustice, poverty, authoritarianism, and civil rights, is updated almost immediately after events occur. Reportedly, these technological advances have also brought serious concerns in terms of stability, disruption of family, and intrusion into the lives and rights of individuals.⁶ In other areas, insecurity, uncontrolled population growth, the burden of external debts, oppression, and the growing disparity between the rich and the poor are joining to fuel the production of 17 million refugees, 20 million displaced persons, and massive migrations. This backlash causes ceaseless demands on developed countries, the international community, and especially the United Nations to find ways to mitigate the suffering, the war, the horror, and the fear.

In summary, the end of the Cold War (and, thus, the vanishing of a polarized threat) brought the world's attention to emerging, enduring, and often omnipresent maladies. Religious beliefs, separation of countries, new players, new interests, terrorism, drug trafficking, ethnic conflicts, and natural and man-made disasters strain the resources of the international community in its efforts to unify in order to combat more complex and uncertain

new realities. Confronting these threats demands more creativity and innovative approaches to the upcoming tasks, which may require not only force but also compromises and distinct approaches in terms of means to attain objectives. Victory no longer necessarily means the desired end state, but peaceful settlements to disputes. Therefore, emerging forces such as those noted above appear to dictate today's new international agenda.

The International Community Confronting Today's Threats

Conflict among organized human groups is as old as human society. However, the international community and private organizations are always trying to help the state-based international system function more satisfactorily. "First-Wave Nations" (major industrialized and informational nations) along with major international organizations, such as the UN, have devoted time and resources to procuring peace among belligerent countries and/or delivering humanitarian aid to alleviate suffering in places of need. In the late twentieth century and foreseeably in the first stage of the next century, concepts, such as "interdependability" and "collective or regional security," have been key instruments of foreign policy. As a leading international entity, the UN has dictated the pace in terms of involvement in these endeavors. Article 1.1 of the UN Charter declares that the primary purpose of the organization is to maintain peace and security. The charter specifies two chief means to this end, namely pacific settlement of disputes (Chapter VI) and collective enforcement against threats to the breaches of the peace (Chapter VII).⁷ Thus, the UN emphasizes cooperative security, keeping the peace, fostering voluntary democratic change, and promoting respect for human rights.

Since the collapse of the USSR, the UN has assumed a more active role in resolving regional conflicts. In the last four years alone the UN has mounted over a dozen military operations--more than in the previous four decades together.⁸ Today's operations are greater in

scope and complexity. Such missions range from peacekeeping and peace enforcement to humanitarian assistance. Consequently, the Secretary General recommended expanding military involvement so allies and the international community could provide more means to enforce or help carry out UN resolutions for peace.

The Ex-Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev, addressing a UN General Assembly on December 7, 1988, hailed the role of the UN peacekeeping endeavors as crucial in the new world order, and he described the deployment of up to 700,000 personnel from 1948 to 1994 in several peace operations, as being an extraordinary achievement. In the same manner, President George Bush ordered the deployment of peacekeeping forces to Somalia and to other areas for peace enforcement operations, such as in the Kurd-Iraq border dispute. In 1995, NATO forces deployed to Bosnia and Macedonia. The Clinton administration has emphasized its commitment to building US support for peacekeeping by making the Congress and the American people genuine participants in the processes that support US decision-making on new and ongoing operations. The President himself stated that UN peacekeeping reform was a key goal in his administration because its efficiency serves "our national interests." According to US Defense Secretary William Perry, the US's mission in Bosnia was and still is in a peacekeeping capacity which will stand until 1998.⁹

President Bill Clinton has also ordered the deployment of, initially, one thousand men in a humanitarian mission to Zaire. He will also reinforce the units already stationed in Bosnia. Canada and France agreed also to send ground troops to feed the starving, fleeing refugees of Zaire. By early February 1997, the US was providing logistical support and air troops to help peacekeeping efforts in Africa, specifically, to Liberia. Accordingly, five C-130s and about two hundred airmen were sent. Those assets and personnel will join the two thousand peacekeepers already in place from the Economic Community of West African States in an attempt to end

Liberia's seven years of civil war. At least 200,000 people, most of them civilians, have died in the war. Enormous efforts are being undertaken to disarm the six warring factions on the grounds of the accord signed late last year. If bloodshed stops, a presidential election may be conducted on May 30, 1997 (thirteen previous attempts have failed).¹⁰ As a matter of reference, to June 30, 1994, the total number of UN peacekeepers (troops, military observers, and civilian police) deployed throughout the world, was 71,543.

The current US National Security Strategy, known as "Engagement and Enlargement," is designed to expand the international community of market democracies while deterring and limiting a range of threats to America, its allies, and other interests.¹¹ Maintaining a strong defense, promoting cooperative security measures, working to open foreign markets, and promoting democracy abroad are the policy initiatives intended to secure these objectives.

Along these lines, Russia is struggling to play a major role in rebuilding and stabilizing the new states carved from the former Soviet Union. As manifested by some of its key governmental officials and other important politic-military leaders, such as General Alexander Lebed, Russia believes it has the right to intervene in the "near-abroad" region around it. It is now conducting a reform package which includes an alteration of the way Russians perform peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions and encourages the states integration/participation in regional security alliances. Hence, force projection and dissemination along regional lines are predictable. However, the Russian Army has been deployed sometimes with questionable consent, into Moldova, Georgia, Abkhazia, Ossetia, Estonia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Chechnya, and Bosnia in a peacekeeping capacity. Furthermore, while recognizing that NATO expansion will proceed, its political establishment opposes the addition of NATO members claiming that this affects Russia's national security interests.¹²

A high-level British military official, the United Kingdom (UK) Chief of Defense Staff, while addressing the CGSC 1997s class, stated that the UK is willing to participate in "multinationalism" to promote peace and to participate in military operations other than war (MOOTW) especially in peacekeeping operations. So far, he said, "We have been in places we had never imagined, and it is our commitment to keep on doing so." Peacekeeping represents an immense challenge to UK armed forces (in training, logistics, and manpower). Insofar as training for Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), the British deem structural training, as opposed to individual training, as fundamental. The IFOR in Bosnia has been a complete success. However, nations have to be aware that over time they need to improve. New missions have been attached to the overall peacekeeping concept: municipal elections, war criminal arrests, more territorial disputes, release of refugees, and prisoners of war, more ethnic crises, not only in Bosnia, but in Zaire, and who knows where in the future.¹³

NATO and its allies are also moving to conform to a European security architecture through cooperation in successful peacekeeping operations. In its Oslo Council Meeting, the Defense Planning Committee asserted that they are permanently upgrading their capabilities by way of training and exercises, identifying problems, and looking for quick solutions (if any) in terms of command and control issues, logistic support, and infrastructure. The concluding statement of that meeting was; "We had concluded that support for UN and CSCE peacekeeping should be included among the missions of NATO forces and Headquarters."¹⁴

Regarding the recent refugee crisis in Zaire, countries around the world immediately responded by sending humanitarian aid and offering troops to secure the delivery of such aid. Canada, for example, offered a significant contingent to lead a multilateral humanitarian assistance task force. The French proposed a multinational military intervention. Spain also agreed to send troops. Washington gave \$30 million to the relief effort, but found itself in a

dichotomy of sending troops in view of lessons painfully learned in nearby Somalia.¹⁵ Major Latin-American nations, although in a minor fashion, have also participated in peacekeeping operations (for example, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, and so on), and it seems that in the future they will be more involved in regional collective security measures. What is clear is that the international community and leading nations increasingly show interest in participation in collective regional security and humanitarian assistance. Therefore, this international commitment for "interdependency" and "collective security" undoubtedly suggests that peacekeeping deployments will continue to occupy center stage in the new world order.

Peacekeeping: An International Response

Peacekeeping is an institution evolved in the grey zone between pacific settlement and military enforcement. The main goal of peacekeeping is to bring about and preserve a cessation of hostilities, promote international stability and support peaceful change outside the axis of great-power rivalry.¹⁶

First, it is assumed that peacekeeping operations require all participants to demonstrate a great deal of understanding and insight and a high degree of willingness to cooperate. Without this attitude, the intention to prevent or to stop conflicts during their acute phases is unlikely to succeed. In peacekeeping operations, settlement, not victory, is the ultimate measure of success, even though settlement is rarely achievable through military efforts alone. Moreover, peace operations are geared to gain a resolution by conciliation among the competing parties, rather than by forceful termination. Peace operations are designed primarily to create or sustain the conditions in which diplomatic and political acts may proceed. In peace operations, military actions must complement diplomatic, economic, informational, and humanitarian efforts in pursuing the overarching political objectives. In other words, peacekeeping intrinsically embodies seeking to prevent conflict and to keep the peace, bringing hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means.

Peace operations comprise three types of activities: support to democracy (peacemaking, peacebuilding, and preventive diplomacy), peacekeeping, and peace enforcement (protection of humanitarian assistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee or denial of movement, establishment of protected zones, and forcible separation of belligerents).¹⁷

Peacekeeping can be a risky undertaking. Forces face unusual situations in which skills other than pure military training are necessary. Lessons learned reveal that preparedness in certain areas, which will be discussed later, become key to a mission's success. Major General Gunther Greindl, Director General of International Policies, of the Austrian government, and a highly experienced peacekeeper, argues that peacekeeping demands special operational techniques, and thus training, directed at developing modern instruction methods and procedures, as cornerstones.¹⁸

In peacekeeping operations, the soldier must perform his military duties in the calm and diplomatic manner of an impartial provider of protection and support. This reflects back to the premise that peacekeepers ought to have special training. For example, gaining host-nation trust is crucial because if it is lost, or never fully realized, an operation may be crippled, putting personnel in deadly peril. Absence of clear local understanding and support of the peacekeeper's role in a region can hinder freedom of movement and tightly constrain the use of certain equipment. Moreover, in war-torn countries not all armed elements will be under effective political control (such as in Haiti and Somalia). Thus, the lack of civil order may require law enforcement actions and in many cases a more forceful presence than ordinarily justified (as in Bosnia). For instance, minesweeping and skills in controlling convoys were reportedly important issues in Bosnia. Personnel participating in this capacity must remain neutral and show neutrality at all times. This rule applies not only to officials, but also to each one of the

soldiers in the field. Consequently, realistic training including nontraditional military duties as well as conditioning personnel to the environment of the locale (if possible), must be considered.

Several indicators allow predictions that peacekeeping operations and force requirements to enforce peace will be an increasing trend in the new world order. Interestingly, however, peacekeeping has been associated with conflict resolution, producing more complex operations to rebuild the peace torn by civil war, such as the recent missions in Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia. The cases of Somalia, Haiti, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and now Zaire demonstrate that disorder in the international system is increasing. Whether in the form of outside mediation or support for implementing a peace settlement, action is required if change is to be shaped and directed in ways that will promote peace, justice, human rights, prosperity, and ultimately, democracy. Therefore, the international community ought to convey efforts to increase preparedness and readiness of military forces.

The pattern of the increasing involvement of military and paramilitary establishments in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations also implies the immense future requirements in the international community for such deployment. To portray this thought a review of recent events in the UN is made. In early November 1996, UN Secretary General Boutrus Ghali called for an urgent Security Council meeting to decide whether or not to deploy a multinational force to Zaire. The force was to deliver food and other supplies as well as to provide security to convoys with food and medicine intended for use by the millions of starving, fleeing refugees.¹⁹

A continuance of this pattern can be seen in the tremendous effort Russia undertook to deliver peacekeeping forces to near-abroad countries (former Soviet nations) to help them peacefully reach settlements in ethnic and territorial differences. Through bilateral or unilateral agreements, Russia has lately deployed its armed forces to perform peacekeeping missions and

to remain, apparently temporarily, in several new nation-states with the purpose of assuring peace, and political stability, and to defend them from nearby foes (such as Abkhazia, Tajikistan, Bosnia, Georgia, Moldova).

After the last khaki-uniformed Japanese Imperial Army units surrendered at the end of World War II, 608 blue-helmeted Japanese troops served under the UN flag that began a new era of proactive Japanese international presence. Notwithstanding internal turmoil, in 1992 Japanese soldiers began deploying to Southwest Asia, especially to Cambodia, to participate in peacekeeping operations.²⁰

In several countries, such as Namibia, Cambodia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, Bosnia, Western Sahara, Somalia, Panama, and so forth, a contingent of international experts and military personnel lately supervised and conducted elections. This trend seems to be gaining ground in a more clearly political orientation involving independent nations, UN, and NATO in efforts to reduce tensions and to resolve conflicts.

Venezuela's Potential Contribution

Since Venezuela is a signatory country to the UN, it may be requested to perform duties in any given UN commitment. Therefore, Venezuela's military forces must be ready and capable of conducting operations in extraterritorial theaters. Venezuela's defense establishment is vested in the person of the President who is the commandant-in-chief. The control of the armed forces, though only administratively, is exercised by the Minister of Defense. The President is assisted in defense matters by the Supreme Council of National Defense (CONASEDE), which consists of the Council of Ministers, the Chairman of the Joint of Chief Staffs, and individual service commanders.

Venezuela's foreign policy includes the use of its armed forces in peace operations. In a telephone interview, the Venezuelan representative, Minister Counselor Ricardo Mario Rodriguez, Vice President of the Hemisphere Security Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS), pointed out that Venezuelan foreign policy highly favors the deployment of Venezuelan military forces and civilian personnel in peacekeeping and humanitarian roles. In fact, Venezuela has sent officers as observers to the pacification process in El Salvador, and it has participated in minesweeping and disarmament tasks in Nicaragua and other Central American countries. Moreover, Venezuela has lately assigned observers and monitors to other peace operation sites, such as the Sahara Desert, Kuwait, Bosnia, and so on. The minister stated, however, that since peacekeeping operations have not been a main priority in the military agenda, Venezuela has not participated worldwide in a much larger fashion.²¹

Venezuelan Army General Manuel Delgado Gainza and General (National Guard) Orlando V. Hernandez, Venezuelan Chief and Delegate, respectively, before the Inter-American Defense Board, said that Venezuela is now expanding its participation in peacekeeping missions and it has increased its presence on the Board (from one General to three Generals and four full Colonels), as clear indication of its commitment. General Hernandez stated that just recently a National Guard detachment led by a lieutenant was assigned to monitor minesweeping operations in El Salvador. However, it should be noted that UN and allied nations' military interests, along with poor preparedness, could inhibit success in future peacekeeping missions. Therefore, participating nations should observe a well-organized and disseminated body of procedures and understandings. For example, in light of what has been discussed earlier, in future multinational operations, the VAF's contribution, even if small, would pose a significant challenge. Undoubtedly, therefore, the UN would have to consider doctrine, training, and equipment when matching missions with Venezuela's capabilities.

The Venezuelan military is composed of four separated services: Army, Navy, Air Force, and the National Guard. Each branch has unique and particular roles and missions to contribute to overall national objectives. The Venezuelan Armed Forces has approximately 80,000 military personnel on active duty (officers, noncommissioned officers, and conscripts). Article 12 of the Organic Law of the National Armed Forces clearly defines the traditional roles of each branch. Essentially, duties include protecting national citizens and interests and guaranteeing territorial sovereignty and political stability. Traditionally, Army, Navy, and Air Force services execute similar duties and responsibilities everywhere in the world, and Venezuela is no exception. However, it is interesting to note that Venezuelan pioneer leaders envisioned the creation of a force, the National Guard, that would perform special duties during peacetime as well as in wartime.

The National Guard was officially created on August 4, 1937, by General Eleazar Lopez Contreras, who was by then the President of Venezuela. This force would conduct military as well as law enforcement missions. In other words, this military force not only acts as a professional infantry arm during wartime, in which its main mission is the security of communication zones, LOCs, and EPOWs, but it also ensures internal security during peacetime (performing counterdrug operations, counterinsurgency, public order, protecting natural resources, and so forth). The National Guard's functional areas of operations are divided into three main categories: Internal Revenue, Security, and the Protection of Natural Resources.

The National Guard is a multifunctional military force whose spectrum goes beyond traditional military roles and duties, thus becoming a prominent organization in Venezuelan society. Insofar as an arm of the Internal Revenue, the National Guard actively participates in collecting taxes from individuals as well as businesses. It serves as an armed component of the government to impose sanctions and to initiate judicial process against tax evasions. Guardsmen

also guarantee the safety of custom services installations, and they monitor or enforce the collection of customs taxes. The National Guard performs security operations that encompass border patrol action, drug interdiction, counterguerrilla actions, reestablishment of public order, providing aid during natural disasters, providing security of basic and strategic national industries, and so on. The National Guard also helps protect natural resources. It is in charge of controlling wildfires, monitoring the contamination of rivers and exploitation of forestry and minor products, and protecting Venezuela's fauna and flora.

Guardsmen are professional individuals who also receive training in public relations, public order, combat in localities, and urban combat and control. These singular characteristics featuring the National Guard make it the more suitable force within the Venezuelan military establishment to participate in peacekeeping missions. Consequently, if the Venezuelan Armed Forces are called upon to perform multinational operations under UN control, they certainly can provide a remarkable contribution to public security functions and without doubt, will overreach the mission's expectations.

In summary, in light of today's diversified needs, peacekeeping operations have become not only greater in scope, but also more complex in nature. Thus, they call for continuously evolving techniques and procedures to effectively address each dilemma. Because of these new, intricate engagements, to attain success, leaders and soldiers alike must upgrade combat skills and match them with law-enforcement skills.

In peacekeeping operations, the soldier must perform his military duties with maturity and in a calm and diplomatic manner as an impartial provider of protection and support. Therefore, this type of commitment is not for amateurs.

Since Venezuela is a signatory country to the UN, it may be requested (as it has been in the past) to perform duties in any given UN commitment. Consequently, Venezuela's military

forces must be ready and capable of conducting operations in extraterritorial theaters. Venezuela must, as should other Latin American nations, export liberty and peace.

Finally, despite overall success using conscript soldiers, several nations including Venezuela, agreed that professional soldiers and Venezuelan National Guard-like units are more reliable in peacekeeping operations. Heavy combat forces were seen more applicable for peace enforcement engagements. Indeed, disregarding combat and firepower limitations, the unique contribution that organizations like the National Guard of Venezuela could bring to achieve success in peace operations make them a meaningful asset to Task Force peacekeeping (PK) commanders. Truly, the facts, addressed here indicate that certainly there is an urgent need for those kind of units to be included in PK force packages.

¹Enis Dzanic, "Report on Chemical Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1996, 7.

² Ibid.

³Bill Gertz, "Kiev Imperils US Aid With Libya Arms Deal," The Washington Times, 9 December 1996, 1.

⁴"West Must Not Dither On Zaire," Los Angeles Times, 8 November 1996, 10.

⁵Christopher K. Haas, "The Supper MilGroup: A Model for Supporting Counterinsurgency in 2010, Defense, Democracy, and Development: Challenges and Opportunities from a Regional Perspective, The Second Annual Regional Strategy Studies Conference (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 March 1997).

⁶Ghali Boutrus, An Agenda for Peace, (New York: United Nations, 1992), 7.

⁷Ramesh Thakur, "UN Peacekeeping in the New World Disorder," A Crisis of Expectations, 1995, 3-5.

⁸Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeper: A Road to Sarajevo 1993, 48.

⁹J. Brian Dunn, "Peace Enforcement: The Mythical Mission," Army, November 1996, 8-12.

¹⁰"US Transports African Troops," Paperboy, 12 February 1997,

11 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement The White House, February 1996, i.

12 John G. Roos, "Almost Allies," Armed Forces Journal, (December 1996), 20.

13 Peter A. Inge, "U.K. Perspectives toward Peacekeeping," (Conference, Fort Leavenworth, KS., January 29, 1997).

14 R.F. Driscoll, "Combining Vision and Reality in UN Peacekeeping Operations: A Closer Look at Europe," Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Coalition Warfare, (National Defense University, Washington, DC: 1994), 203.

15 "West Must Not Dither on Zaire," Los Angeles Times, November 8, 1996, 10.

16 Ramesh Thakur, "UN Peacekeeping in the New World Disorder," A Crisis of Expectations, 1995, 3-5.

17 US Army, Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), iv.

18 "Ready For Peace," Austrian Training Centre for Peace-Keeping Operations, 1996, 3.

19 "Millions of Starving Refugees Caused by the Civil War in Zaire," CNN TV News World Report, November 8, 1996.

20 Andrew H. Kim, "Japan and Peacekeeping Operations," Military Review, (April 1994), 22-23.

21 Ricardo M. Rodriguez, Ph.D., Minister Counselor and Vice-President of Hemisphere Security Commission, O.A.S., Telephone interview, February, 1997.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

The research design to be used in carrying out this project is the “document analysis method.” A number of written official documents from government sources (national and international), journal articles, periodicals, legal records, and data kept by institutions for administrative or governmental purposes will be reviewed. Moreover, a survey will be conducted among the international officers currently attending CGSC, 1996-1997, who have had peacekeeping experience in any peace operation site. The information drawn from them will substantially enhance the research findings. The sample to be analyzed will be 95 percent of the total, which is 94 international officers.

The purpose of this study is to examine the peacekeeping requirements and forces needed for the twenty-first century in regard to the feasibility and suitability of deploying the Venezuelan Armed forces, especially the National Guard, in such capacity. Emphasis will be given to the current stage of preparedness and readiness of these forces.

This research is limited to analyzing the peacekeeping dimension of peace operations. However, by giving a more ample picture of what peace operations are, the thesis will broadly cover some related missions: peace enforcement, peace building, peacemaking, and so forth. This study does not intend to deeply survey doctrinal standards in forming joint task forces for joint and combined peace operations, although it will allude to the relevance of training,

planning, organization, analysis of the environment to be deployed to, and lessons learned from previous peacekeeping endeavors.

Methodology

In finding answers to the research question, previous works on or about peacekeeping operations, (these and other sources will be discussed in a literature and source review in Appendix A), especially those that highlight the potential for multinational forces conducting peacekeeping efforts in the near and long-term future, will be reviewed. Then the roles and missions of forces performing in this capacity under UN control or unilaterally will be clearly defined. The keystone operational definitions will be clearly described to avoid misunderstanding or ambiguity. Finally, the training needed to reach an optimum or more desirable stage to participate in such military and diplomatic endeavors will be addressed.

A review will be conducted of the policy, performance, and experiences of selected countries (US, Russia, Canada) conducting peace operations, unilaterally or under UN command and control. The US was chosen because it possesses one of the larger military establishments of the world, especially in terms of technology, force projection, and strategic lift (aerial and naval). These capabilities, coupled with its foreign policy, keep the US highly involved in international peacekeeping operations. Russia seems to have taken the role of the big brother of the Eastern European countries. And, it is now struggling to subtly extend its influence in the near-abroad areas. Russia has offered and sent, requested or not, peacekeeping forces to former Soviet countries to help them peacefully solve their disputes. Canada has a long experience in these kind of operations since it has been involved in it from the beginning. And besides, Canada's population size as well as its military apparatus, is similar to Venezuela's. Consequently, these

countries' experiences and lessons learned will more realistically reflect what "peacekeeping" is all about; thus, allowing a more refined product to be gleaned from this research.

Personal and telephone interviews will be conducted to UN, OAS, and Venezuelan officials to enrich the findings of this project and to provide more fidelity to the final product. Also a careful review of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, its policy in terms of international deployment, and the suitability of its military services, especially the National Guard, to perform peacekeeping operations will be conducted. Finally, conclusions will be drafted from analyses of the reviewed material and collected data and specific recommendations will be made.

Because of the time constraint, daily development of events, and new worldwide situations that may affect the outcome of this project, all sources and data collection will end in May 1997. Anything occurring after that date will not be taken into account.

To achieve the objectives of this study, a number of questions require close consideration:

1. Are there any indications in the international arena that suggest future requirements for peacekeeping operations?
2. What has been the international community's posture toward today's troublesome environment?
3. Have peacekeeping operations evolved?
4. Are there newcomers providing peacekeeping? Why?
5. What is the position of leading Latin-American countries toward peacekeeping?
6. Is this type of involvement relevant (geopolitically and militarily) to Venezuela?
7. Are the Venezuelan Armed Forces prepared and ready to conduct PKOs?
8. How does the Venezuelan National Guard fit into this scenario?
9. What kind of training is required to be ready and prepared to conduct PKOs?

10. What perspective do the International Officers attending CGSC have regarding the future requirements of PKOs?

Operational Definitions

Several operational definitions, generally accepted by the US, UN, Canada, and Russia will be set forth. The basic purpose for this is to clarify and establish standards in the terminology that will be used in this project. This would serve also as a system of generally accepted peacekeeping terms and concepts that characterize the actions taken in the course of performing these operations. An incorrect or inexact usage of these definitions might lead to confusion or mutual misunderstanding.

Peace Operations. United States doctrine, as defined in FM 100-23, defines peace operations as “an umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities; activities with predominantly diplomacy lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacebuilding) and two complementary, predominantly military, activities (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement).”¹

Peacekeeping. Field Manual 100-23 defines peacekeeping as “military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents; designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement.”²

The UN defines peacekeeping as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is the technique that expands the possibilities for both prevention of conflict and the making of peace.”³

In Russia, the term peacekeeping operations is:

A common term for various types of activities carried out: to resolve conflicts; to prevent conflict escalation; to halt or prevent military actions; to uphold law and order in a conflict

zone; to conduct humanitarian actions; to restore social and political institutions whose functioning has been disrupted by the conflict; and to restore basic conditions for daily living. Peacekeeping operations are also conducted with the consent of one or all sides of the conflict and fall into one of two categories. The first includes a continuation of peacemaking operations. The second includes operations conducted to implement a previously signed accord.⁴

Peacemaking. FM 100-23 defines peacemaking as “a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges ends to disputes and resolves issues that led to disputes.”⁵

In Russia, peacemaking operations are generally with the mutual consent of the combating sides, or possibly at their request. For example, the parties may decide, independently or under pressure from international organizations or individual states, to cease military actions, but they are unable to do so without help from the world community and international peacekeeping forces. Its goals include: helping stop military actions and organizing the negotiation process.”⁶

The UN looks at peacemaking as the “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.”⁷

Peacebuilding. FM 100-23 defines peacebuilding as “postconflict actions, predominately diplomatic, that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”⁸

To the UN peacebuilding is “the post-conflict actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.... It prevents the recurrence of violence among nations and people.”⁹

Peace Enforcement. US Field Manual 100-23 defines peace enforcement as “the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international

authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.”¹⁰

Humanitarian Assistance. Joint Publication 1-02 defines humanitarian assistance as “programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in a great damage to or loss of property.” “The United States’ assistance is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.”¹¹

Preventive Diplomacy. Field Manual 100-23 describes preventive diplomacy as “diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis and at removing the sources of conflict before violence erupts or to limit the spread of violence when it occurs.”¹²

The UN refers to preventive diplomacy as “the most desirable efficient employment of diplomacy to ease tensions before they result in conflict or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain and resolve its underlying causes.”¹³ It may need early warning, preventive deployment, and in some cases, demilitarized zones.

Preventive Deployment. The UN says that preventive “deployment could take place when two countries feel that United Nations presence on both sides of their border can discourage hostilities; furthermore, preventive deployment could take place when a country feels threatened and requests the deployment of an appropriate United Nations presence along its side of the border alone.”¹⁴

¹U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 111.

²Ibid.

³Boutrous B. Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, (New York: United Nations, 1992), 11.

⁴Andrei Demurenko, Dr. Alexander Niktin et al., Basic Terminology and Concepts in International Peacekeeping Operations: An Analytical Review, translated by Robert R. Love (Fort Leavenwoth, Kansas: Foreign Military Studies Office, December 1996), 7.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ghali, 11.

⁸U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 112.

⁹Ghali, 13.

¹⁰Field Manual 100-23, 112.

¹¹U.S. Army, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, (Washington, DC: Joint Warfighting Center, 1995), GL-06.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ghali, 13.

¹⁴Ibid., 17.

CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS OF PEACEKEEPING DOCTRINE AND ITS CURRENT STAGE

This chapter provides a doctrinal framework for peacekeeping operations in terms of roles and missions, training requirements, and logistics. The lessons learned from two major peace operations (Somalia and Bosnia) will be examined as well as special attention given to other missions relevant to this study. It will refer also to new and future challenges for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) in the view of scholars, internationalists, diplomats, practitioners, and international officers currently attending the US Army Command and General Staff College.

Doctrinal Roles and Missions

The term “peacekeeping” may mean different things to different people, military establishments, and states. Therefore, it is no surprise that there are several, albeit slightly different, operational interpretations among the members of the UNO or NATO, and of even more significance, to other new practitioners. Nevertheless, a number of states agree that peacekeeping consists of operations to maintain international peace and security, to peacefully diffuse situations that might otherwise deter friendly relations, to peacefully settle conflicts or take appropriate measures related to situations threatening the peace.¹ Of special note is that peacekeepers must remain impartial and form a neutral body within a conflict.

The expression peacekeeping has also been used to describe internal security situations in which either military personnel or police forces have been involved (mostly in an enforcement

capacity). The International Peace Academy defines peacekeeping as the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states through the mediation of a peaceful third party's intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace.² The UN peacekeeping role is to keep the peace in an objective way. A close working relationship must be maintained with the parties concerned in the dispute. This is accomplished by diplomatic efforts and the force commander and his senior and junior staff constantly meeting with the senior members of government and leaders of warring factions.

Peacekeeping operations result from a "mandate" of the UN Security Council through a resolution which states the driving motive of such decisions and establishes the force required to undertake the commitment.³

The United States Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, states that peacekeeping embodies a new term that covers a wide range of activities. It also creates and sustains the necessary conditions for peace to flourish. Peace operations comprise three types of activities: *support to democracy* (peacemaking, peacebuilding, and preventive diplomacy), *peacekeeping, and peace enforcement* (protection of humanitarian assistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, the guarantee or denial of movement, establishment of protected zones, and forcible separation of belligerents).⁴

In peace operations, *settlement*, not victory, is the ultimate measure of success, even though settlement is rarely achievable through military efforts alone. Moreover, peace operations are geared to gain a resolution by conciliation among the competing parties rather than by termination by force. Peace operations are designed primarily to create or sustain the conditions in which diplomatic and political acts may proceed. In peace operations, military

actions must complement diplomatic, economic, informational, and humanitarian efforts in pursuing the overarching political objectives.⁵

The US Army's Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) argues that peacekeeping operations involve military or paramilitary operations undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties. These actions are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce or cease-fire agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.⁶ For instance, the multinational force and observer (MFO) operation in the Sinai provide a good example of a force conducting such missions. Normally, peacekeeping is authorized under the provisions of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which discusses the peaceful settlement of disputes. Peace enforcement is frequently presented under conditions of a low level of consent and questionable impartiality, and is authorized under Chapter VII. The US Army PKI defines peace enforcement as the application of military force, or the threat of its use, pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions.⁷

It is also believed that peacekeeping forces do not have orthodox military objectives and require negotiation rather than fighting. The goal of peacekeeping units is not the creation of peace but the containment of war, so others can reach peace in stable conditions. The in-theater stabilization facilitated and supervised by peacekeeping forces is meant to be supplemented by an ongoing search for a diplomatic solution to the underlying conflict.⁸

The term peacekeeping, nonetheless, does not mean the same to everybody everywhere and, of course, its means and rationale differs sometimes from country to country or from an international organization to nation states. The UN, for instance, defines peacekeeping as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as

well. Peacekeeping is the technique that expands the possibilities for both prevention of conflict and the making of peace.”⁹

To Russia, on the other hand, peacekeeping operations are “a common term for various types of activities carried out: to resolve conflicts; to prevent conflict escalation; to halt or prevent military actions; to uphold law and order in a conflict zone; to conduct humanitarian actions; to restore social and political institutions whose functioning has been disrupted by the conflict; and to restore basic conditions for daily living. Peacekeeping operations are also conducted with the consent of one or all sides of the conflict and fall into one of two categories: the first includes a continuation of peacemaking operations: the second includes operations conducted to implement a previously signed accord.”¹⁰ Later, we will see, in the Russian approach toward peacekeeping operation section, that Russian military leadership consistently agrees that it has the moral obligation to enforce peace in its near-abroad neighbors in order to ensure regional stability. More likely than not, Russia will not wait until a multinational organization solicits them to intervene; it will most likely always be proactive in this matter.

Doctrinally, individual military personnel may be called on to monitor or observe a developing situation and report on events to the authorizing authority. The deployment of military observers in most cases suffices to avoid a breakout of armed combat or to ensure honoring of agreements. Soldiers must be impartial and responsible to the chain of command. The role of observers and monitors engaged in battlefield stabilization has been extensively developed since it was established (UNTSO) in 1948. Austria has had experienced observers as far back as the 1960s when they deployed units to the Congo and Middle East. Austrian doctrine considers that in light of the risks at stake, military observers should perform with professionalism, self-control, and courage.¹¹ Observers and monitors are commonly deployed on an individual basis. Their more frequent task is being liaison officers and to oversee certain

activities such as elections. They also are called on to report, in a timely fashion, military information, such as the withdrawal of armed forces of belligerent parties (the disengagement process), potentially tense situations, the interface of forces in a given demilitarized line or areas, and so on.

In addition, doctrine establishes that observers and monitors do not normally act in response to violations. Their duties may include numerous supervisory tasks. Some of the tasks might be to observe: (1) cease-fire lines, borders, demilitarized zones, restricted areas, enclaves, and other geographical areas; (2) the execution of the provisions of treaties, truce, arms control agreements, and other binding agreements; (3) the exchange of POWs, civilians, human remains, and territory; and (4) censuses, referendums, plebiscites, and elections.

Likewise, observers and monitors may be required to investigate complaints and violations; to conduct negotiations and mediations; to act as liaison with local civilian officials, the press, the host nation, and international agencies; and supervise a truce. Because of the intrinsic complexity of these tasks and the risk involved, soldiers deployed in such capacity should be part of the solution, not part of the problem. In other words, superior negotiation skills, high standards, and professionalism are critical to the successful accomplishment of these actions.¹²

Assistance activities by truce supervisory forces may include the requirements to provide humanitarian assistance within the area of operation and to supervise demobilization, demilitarization measures, measures of law and order, and stability on an interim basis until local civil authority can reestablish law and public order. In truce supervisory missions, peacekeeping forces may be used to supervise a peace or cease-fire agreement. They can insist that the local population comply with specific conditions of a peace agreement, such as allowing patrols in sensitive areas, investigating installations or vehicles for prohibited items, and

establishing movement control points. In this capacity, units would physically interpose themselves between the disputing parties. In such cases, they may occupy a disengagement zone. In addition, military forces supervising truce agreements are generally armed with organic small weapons as opposed to being unarmed like other observers and monitors, but it is grounded on the threat. Take for instance, the case when UN Resolution 598 mandated a cease-fire in the Iraq-Iran war. Shortly thereafter, in 1988, a group of UN military personnel was sent to conduct negotiations on details of the implementation of the armistice. They were also to monitor, supervise, and confirm the cessation of hostilities and the return of all troops to their respective countries.¹³

Peacekeeping activities also embrace relations with the media. Captain Robert Bensburg's unit, 361st Press Camp Headquarters, Fort Totten, New York, participated in a joint information bureau at Tuzla Air Base in Bosnia explained what while in the Balkans his unit's mission was to arrange convoys for and serve as liaison escort for worldwide media traveling through the region. Colonel Robert Gaylor similarly stated that they had to prepare for the arrival and coordinate the security of the presidential family, when President Clinton and the First Lady visited the area of operations. These officers added that they also provided health care services to children.¹⁴

The range of activities, which are only loosely covered by the aggregate term peacekeeping, demonstrate the notable flexibility and responsiveness that has come to characterize UN operations. But the nature of peacekeeping operations has been changing. Traditionally, PK had seven distinguishing characteristics: (1) consent and cooperation of parties; (2) UN command and control; (3) international backing; (4) multinational composition; (5) no use of force; (6) military neutrality; and (7) political impartiality.

The Evolving Nature of Peacekeeping

The new world suddenly created by the collapse of the Cold War took the peacekeepers (contributors as well as international organizations) by surprise. Yet, there have been major changes since then. The duties to be carried out were clearly understood. Security problems were usually local and isolated. The international force was, therefore, lightly armed. And, as observed by some authors, the peacekeepers' main weapons were tact, mediation, and publicity.¹⁵

The end of the superpower confrontation increased the life-threat risks involving PKOs, since it helped to unleash profound and ancient collective-memory problems (such as nationalistic, religious, ethnic, and linguistic conflicts). Therefore, evolving strategies and techniques for dealing with these new international issues ought to be seriously considered by practitioners and collegiate international bodies.

A new factor has dramatically impacted peacekeeping operations: it is the "CNN factor." The spread of "global television," instantly conveying pictures of deaths and human suffering, has resulted in public demand for actions. Consequently, PKOs follow the cameras. Remoteness no longer matters. As pointed out by a scholar, the distance of a country, whether geographical or in terms of interest, is much less important than the impact of the pictures of what is happening there. Conversely, a disturbance not within reach of television cameras, or that does not catch their attention, becomes "diplomatically invisible." Coverage of starving Somali people and the Rwandan massacre and refugee situation produced a demand for urgent international action; the reaction to fighting in Tajikistan or in Liberia was practically inaudible.¹⁶

Other items that fall within the new paradigm and more complex model of peacekeeping will be reviewed. Although modern peacekeeping is most often thought of as a function

performed by military forces, it is very much a joint venture by a great number of organizations--political, democratic, diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, media, military, police, and electoral. It is also frequently carried out under conditions of uncertainty and personal danger. All intervening agencies and nations must act in concert if success is to be achieved. The military role has grown dramatically during this upsurge in peacekeeping operations. Yet, it has not guaranteed success; rather, it has fostered the need for more skills and professionalism of every component. Basically, what this new paradigm or reality in peacekeeping demands is better management and control, which is translated into a more cohesive "unity of effort."

It must be recognized that today's world malaises (such as ancestral, ethnic hatreds, decolonization, starvation, refugees, drug trafficking, and border disputes) cannot be treated or alleviated with simple solutions like military operations alone. These attempts just provide limited and temporary answers because they do not address the underlying root causes of conflicts. However, they do and can buy time, jump start negotiations, and reduce the degree of violence, disorder, or starvation. But these effects are unlikely to be permanent unless accompanied by long-term political and humanitarian efforts to resolve the sources that ignited the conditions.

Changes in Traditional Peacekeeping

Have principles changed? The foundations remain valid, if not more so. However, the emphasis of some principles has shifted directions. Changes in missions will also be the norm because PKOs are multidimensional, and focus on creating conditions for political solutions. Nevertheless, the military seems to increase the range of its tasks, thus intermingling military with civilian functions. Therefore, first a review of what has happened with the principles will be made.

The principles of PKOs as currently published retain their value and authenticity. They are:

1. Legitimacy
2. Active support to the Security Council
3. Commitment of troop contributing nations
4. Clear and achievable mandate
5. Consent and cooperation
6. Impartiality and objectivity
7. Use of force
8. Unity of efforts¹⁷

The following paragraphs discuss the principles that may have to be strengthened or added to:

Unity of Effort. Unity of effort includes dealing with doctrinal conflicts, linguistic barriers, different levels of capability, and different levels of training. These will always influence the unity of effort or purpose. The challenge will be to overcome these obstacles. Strong leadership skills are the key to achieving unity.

Use of Force. What has been witnessed at several recent PKOs sites unquestionably indicates that use of force should be placed in perspective. Use of force is not uniquely the use of armed force or weapons, rather it runs the gamut from simple presence of the peacekeeper on the ground, through the provision of appropriately equipped forces according to the operation environment itself, to a willingness to accomplish the mandate by the adequate use of Rules of Engagement (ROE).

Consensus Planning. In a multidimensional operation consensus planning between the leadership and all of the components must become the norm. Contingent components should not

go to these missions with a different mind-set, hidden agendas, or separate procedures or planning objectives.

Adaptive Control. Rigid command and control structures, addressing the nature of current operations, would impede timely actions to be taken and the easy assimilation of information that is vital in such setting. Therefore, a flexible control structure works best.

Security of Operations. Force protection, similar to that of conventional military operations, is paramount if nations are to continue to provide forces to dangerous operations such as current PKOs.

Simplicity. Complex operations must be translated into simple tasks; plans must be simple; and directives must be clear.

At the tactical level, traditional PKOs are usually organized to interpose forces between combatants, who agree to negotiations, or to monitor a cease-fire. In addition, UN forces may now be tasked with preventive deployment (as UN stand-by forces), troop demobilization, humanitarian relief, election monitoring, and population movement control mission. The environment in which these tasks are carried out may be uncertain and volatile. To a much greater degree than in past operations, contributing states must now consider the degree of risk in the operations in which they participate.

Note that peacekeeping in the 1990s has extended and changed not just in numbers but also in the nature and scope of its missions. Lately these operations have also required forces to perform tasks such as the following:

1. Military
2. Police
3. Human rights monitoring and enforcement
4. Information dissemination

5. Observation, organization, and conduct of elections
6. Rehabilitation
7. Repatriation
8. Administration

Recent deployments under the auspices of the UN and NATO have been directed to supervise and implement of multinational followup to ensure free and fair elections. A contingent of international experts and military personnel has lately supervised and/or conducted elections in several countries (Namibia, Cambodia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, Bosnia, Western Sahara, Somalia, Panama). This trend of a more clearly political orientation of UN, NATO, and unilateral involvement is gaining ground in efforts to reduce tension and resolve conflict.

Profound political changes in the world and the eruption of numerous local, ethnic, and religious-based conflicts will continue to impose changes to the practical execution of peacekeeping. It will become increasingly difficult to distinguish between traditional peacekeeping without use of force, as it is known today, and the envisaged peace enforcement, which includes the use of force. United Nation and NATO peacekeepers, are not strangers to hostile reactions by host nation antagonistic factions. As a result, the security of participating personnel is an important issue (for instance, in the case in which the Austrian interpretation of the right of self-defense using arms in peacekeeping, albeit maintaining its original spirit, now includes the use of force against any resistance encountered during a mission.¹⁸

Actually, there have been a series of reforms as to how to conduct peacekeeping. For example the UN enhanced its credibility by appropriating the necessary military deterrence force to peacekeeping operations. Thus, the full conceptual continuance of UN military operations could range from peacekeeping through deterrence to compellent forces. United Nations

Secretary General Boutros Ghali stated that “preventive diplomacy” could be complemented with “preventive deployment.”¹⁹

Hence, early emplacement of peacekeeping units between known rivals in advance of hostilities would prevent conflicts from erupting into violence. Therefore, what is evident is that today’s reforms of peacekeeping operations have begun moving beyond traditional roles and missions to a more preponderant presence and vocation. One of the lessons learned in the Bosnia endeavor is that PKOs, along with tough deterrent measures, pay off. Air-strikes and get-tougher tactics persuaded Bosnian Serb leaders to obey the UN’s order to pull back their guns and lift the siege of Sarajevo. This caused people to think that, had the West gotten tougher earlier, much of the suffering might have been avoided. However, despite the bombardment showing the UN’s resolve, these actions could not deliver peace agreement. “Violence springs violence,” was the saying in light of the subsequent resurgence of fighting during the summer of 1995.²⁰ As we can see, there are no easy answers when trying to resolve other people’s disputes.

The new body of thought in terms of *preventive deployment*, and the employment of harsh measures, has fueled endless controversies among countries of the international community. Concerning the feasibility and merit of standing or standby UN forces, some high ranking military officers, agree that a militarily and politically neutral international peacekeeping presence, supported by the authority of the UN, can help reduce future conflicts. On the other hand, Australian Senator Evans cautions sensible criteria for future use of preventive deployment. He says that it should contain clear objectives, clear mandates, and high probability of objectives being met. Otherwise, we may be tempted to interfere with internal affairs of powerless countries.²¹

Peacekeeping Versus Peace Enforcement

It is imperative for this study to clarify as much as possible about the improper (although frequently) intermingled operational concepts of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Having a clear understanding about what each one entails and being aware of current international threats, policymakers, practitioners, and theorists may distinguish the almost-invisible line between the two. Thus, decisions of employment would be expedited and wiser.

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement conform to the intrinsic spectrum of peace operations. But each one is a distinct type *per se*. Each occurs in a unique environment, hence requiring different tactics, techniques, and procedures. In classic peacekeeping operations, the UN intervening force presumes that parties have fundamentally agreed to end the violence and to implement the provisions of applicable agreements. Thus, military tasks should focus on building confidence and reducing tension to establish the environment of trust necessary to pursue the political, diplomatic, and economic goals of long-term solutions. When both sides in a conflict seek to restore stability and limit violence, peacekeeping has a greater chance for success. Otherwise, there will be a greater chance of physical confrontation between UN forces and a host nation's warring factions. This basically implies that Peace Enforcement (PE) demands a more sophisticated integration of military forces (such as planning, skills, combat power, and so on) with diplomatic and development agencies. In PEOs, solutions also are imposed through the use of or the threat of using force. In PKOs, the presence of military police is frequently enough to generate a secure environment because parties are willing to pursue the necessary political, social, and economic changes.²²

Consequently, if states envision a continuing, effective, and successful role in peace operations, they need to be aware of what current events and lessons learned are being developed in this arena. All of these changes and new situations lead us to think that major reforms and

improvements must be made in how states that provide peacekeeping missions conduct business. These reforms should include, among others, planning, training, staffing, logistics, management of operations, military capacity, and so forth. Therefore, countries lacking experience but willing to contribute in peace operations should consider these things when deciding to participate.

Finally, as it will be examined in depth in the Somalia case, studies show that peace enforcement operations require the employment of a trained unit with a heavy credible force, as opposed to merely light infantry forces. Had an appropriate US force structure been in place in Somalia, the calamity lived there (in terms of command and control and the lack of fire power capability and trained soldiers to perform in this capacity) could have been avoided. In fact, military peace enforcement is what properly trained soldiers do in a transition from peacemaking to peacekeeping.

Reviewing Traditional Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations in Cyprus and Cambodia, very much fit into what the concepts and principles of peacekeeping entail. Nevertheless, readers should be warned that major new tasks (such as conducting and supervising elections and establishing local government and public services) are to be incorporated into the nature of peacekeeping. The former and latter functions were especially evident in Cambodia. Let us see, then, how these operations were conducted, highlighting their major operational and tactical procedures and goals.

Peacekeeping Mission in Cyprus

In March 1964, the UN Security Council unanimously recommended the adoption of Resolution 186 to create a UN peacekeeping force (the UNFICYP) to deploy to Cyprus in order to prevent a recurrence of fighting. In the resolution the Council also called for the restraining of

any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the Republic of Cyprus or that would endanger international peace.²³ The triad involved Greece, Turkey, and the UK. These parties agreed to the intervention. The multinational force comprising UNFICYP contained military contingents from Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the UK. It also included civilian police from several other countries. The geography of Cyprus determined where the intensity of the armed confrontations occurred.

The Security Council expressly informed the UN force commander about its vision of achieving the UNFICYP without resorting to armed force. The troops should carry arms which, however, were to be used only for self-defense, should this become necessary in the discharge of their functions in the interest of preserving international peace and security. The principle of “self-defense” stipulated that minimum force should be applied only after all peaceful means of persuasion had failed. Personnel were also instructed to act with restraint and with complete impartiality toward members of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

The mandate also pointed out that in situations of military confrontation, UN forces were not empowered to impose their views on either party, of necessity negotiating with both, since the consent of both was required if peaceful solutions were to be bolstered.

Accordingly, while supervising the cease-fire agreement, the Force instituted a system of fixed posts and frequent patrols, intervening on the spot, interpositioning to prevent incidents from escalating into serious fighting, demarcating of cease-fire lines, and submitting proposals for dissolving military tensions. They also ensured the elimination of fortifications erected by the two sides. Every effort was made to reduce violence and use persuasion, negotiation, and interposition to stop the fighting. Assistance was also provided to civilians to evacuate wounded people and to endeavor to resolve underlying security problems.

Ad hoc measures were undertaken by the UN forces to save lives, minimize suffering, deter violent crises, and restore essential civilian activities. Some of their duties were as follows:

1. Escort for essential civilian movements, including security to essential merchandise and perishable goods vital to the communities;
2. Harvest arrangements, including escorts and patrols to enable farmers to till their lands;
3. Effort to normalize public services, including but not limited to restoring electricity, postal services, water, and so on;
4. Cooperation with the Red Cross and the Cyprus Joint Relief Commission in providing relief assistance for refugees;
5. Inspection of imported arms and munitions in safe-keeping and openness; and
6. Storing and isolating imported weapons in a fenced and secured area under UNFICYP custody.

Reportedly, this comprehensive approach resulted in some improvement of the situation at hand, but basic political problems continued to limit the effectiveness of UNFICYP's normalization efforts. Problems began when opposing parties gave conflicting interpretations of the UN mandate. The Cypriot Government thought the UN task was to help end the rebellion and to extend its authority over the entire territory in dispute. To the Turks, on the other hand, a "return to normal conditions" meant that the UNFICYP would restore, by force if necessary, the status of the Turkish Cypriot community. Even worse, both the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters were involved in incidents of minor and major proportions against UN forces (such as obstruction and harassment in which they fired on UNFICYP soldiers, manhandled officers, and practiced other unacceptable behavior). Indeed, the Nicosia-Kyrenia road was

closed by the Turkish Cypriots, and a number of UNFICYP soldiers were killed as they sought to carry out their duties.²⁴

Cambodian Peacekeeping Operation

The agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict, which went into force on October 23, 1991, allowed the UN Security Council to mandate the deployment of UN personnel (civilian and military) to assist Cambodian warring parties maintain the cease-fire. The UNTAC's strength varied according to the phase of operations, with between 15,000 to 22,000 people. Within UNTAC's responsibilities its major concerns were:

1. Fostering an environment in which respect of human rights and fundamental freedom would be ensured;
2. Exercising direct control over existing administrative structures in the field of foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security and information;
3. Conducting free and fair general elections;
4. Repatriating and resettling of Cambodian refugees;
5. Instituting rehabilitation efforts;
6. Overseeing the withdrawal from Cambodia of foreign forces and their weapons and military equipment;
7. Supervising the cease-fire and related measures, including regroupment, cantonment, disarming, and demobilization of Cambodian forces;
8. Maintaining weapon control, locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies, and storing of arms and equipment of the cantoned and demobilized military forces;

9. Assisting with mine-clearance, including instituting training programs;
10. Undertaking investigations following complaints of alleged noncompliance with any of the provisions relating to military arrangements; and
11. Supervising the local civilian police to ensure law and order and human rights protection.

It is important to note, that of the four disputing Cambodian parties, only one party (the PDK) was not cooperative. In fact, the PDK refused to allow UNTAC forces to carry out their duties in the area under its control, and it persistently failed to meet its obligations in the peace process. This, of course, caused tensions because a substantial portion of PDK followers remained under arms. However, following the elections a new constitution was ratified, peace returned, and UNTAC forces were withdrawn in late November 1993.²⁵

Is Peacekeeping a Risk-Free Mission?

Once again, there is certainly no such thing as risk-free peacekeeping missions. In 1985, twenty-four Finnish peacekeepers were taken hostage in southern Lebanon by an armed faction. In 1988, Lieutenant Colonel Higgens, the chief of the observer group in Lebanon was taken hostage and murdered. On one single day in Beirut twenty-four US Marines and fifty-six French peacekeepers died in separate attacks. In 1963, forty-four Ghanan peacekeepers serving in the Congo were overrun and killed by one of the many warring factions in the area. In the former Yugoslavia, casualties have mounted to twenty-nine killings, and over 18 US peacekeepers have died in Somalia. Snipers, mines, traffic accidents, artillery attacks and terrorist bombs have taken their toll. Despite having a mine-education program and numerous rehearsals, soldiers were killed and seriously wounded by mines during Operation "Provide Comfort" in Northern Iraq.²⁶

These examples show that threats to peacekeepers (such as, hostage situations, mines, and getting caught between bullets of warring factions) remain very real. Therefore, training how to react, report, negotiate, protect the force, and prevent hostage situations must be incorporated into the training programs of PK training centers around the world.

The Peacekeeping Tempo

The UN has launched more peacekeeping operations in the past seven years than in the previous forty. In fact, there were thirteen from 1946 to 1987 and fifteen from 1988 to 1993. Also, the scope of tasks has expanded. Televised speeches by leaders of leading nations and other international organizations repeatedly hail and reinforce the concept of "interdependability and collective security." This ongoing trend leads nowhere but to an even more accelerated pace for such operations.

In concurrence with the philosophy of the UN's concept of "early deployment," many countries around the world have expressed their support for the UN's stand-by forces high readiness brigade (SHIRBRIG).²⁷ The rationale behind this concept is that it would enhance the UN's rapid deployment capability thus preventing malaise from worsening. As asserted by the UN in a document referred to as "General Concepts About the Stand-By Unit," after the Cold War ended, old and new conflicts suddenly increased all over the world. This required prompt UN intervention as a conflict blocker. Bureaucratic procedures have hindered an expedient answer, thus increasing the chances for unleashing lethal situations.

Accordingly, the SHIRBRIG would be employed on a case-by-case basis, in order to safe guard national sovereignty considerations, on deployments of up to six months duration in peacekeeping operations, including humanitarian tasks mandated by the Security Council under Chapter VI.

Reporting the status of the establishment of the UN stand-by force, the Security Council meeting highlighted the fact that until November 30, 1996, sixty-two nations had confirmed their intention of being part of the stand-by force project, willing to allocate men and logistical support to it. The total number of forces allocated to SHIRBRIG mounted to 80,000 personnel.²⁸ Apportionment included, but was not limited to, infantry battalions, military observers, and CS and CSS units. It was also noted that there was concern about the need for navy, air, communications, multifunctional logistic support, medical, and engineering assets. Reportedly, these are just initial shortcomings that will quickly be fixed.

Indeed, many nations have jumped onto the stand-by forces' bandwagon. On December 15, 1996, Austria, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Denmark signed a "letter of intent" in which they all not only accepted the UN's invitation but also offered their expertise and experience to help put the project together. They stated their intention of initiating the establishment of a permanent planning element of the SHIRBRIG for early January 1997 and to assemble the operational and logistical shops by 1998.

During 1997, the group expects the participating countries' troops to report, thus making them available for SHIRBRIG. It is also expected that by 1999 the unit will be fully operational.²⁹ The first commander for a two-year period of this joint and combined brigade will be Danish Brigadier General Finn Saermark-Thomsen. The UN Secretary General and other UN officials have publicly shown their confidence and belief in the success of this project.

This initiative, intertwined with other multilateral arrangements for collective security, is clearly ratifying the theory of "international interdependency." Other implications for traditional PKO practitioners and newcomers are also apparent. The formation of such a force and its maintenance (as far as manpower and logistic support) will demand a lot of effort and

deployments overseas. It also indicates that peacekeeping operations will form an active part and occupy central stage in future international relationships.

Peacekeeping is not, as some have suggested, a dying art. It remains one of the few and more-effective responses to man's inhumanity to man and to the conditions that feed that inhumanity. All of the aforementioned facts and widespread policy gear us to think that at least in the near future peacekeeping operations will often be necessary. Consequently, peacekeeping is a dynamic and evolving discipline that will continue to play a meaningful role on the international community's stage. It will continuously demand motivation to remain up-to-date.

Training For Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping requires specialized training distinct from those skills that combat units must learn to fight and win. What soldiers do in combat is far different. Basically, soldiers have an enemy who has a plan to overpower or destroy them. Peacekeeping is not so forthright. Often, there is not a plan, and if there is one it is often difficult to identify the enemy. Peacekeeping puts a lot more stress on soldiers because on the battlefield a soldier operates very much on instinct and training. In peacekeeping, a soldier must stop and think through an action or scenario that will involve civilians. "Most of all peacekeeping is compassion, no fear."³⁰

The training and leadership challenge in preparing a force for a peace operation is not just at the soldier or sergeant level; it is also with senior leaders who must translate political goals into achievable military tasks. And it is with majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels who put together tactics, techniques, and procedures into military operations to accomplish specific tasks. All must operate within the constraints of the goals and environment of a given peace mission. For instance, in Bosnia peacekeeping commanders and staffs at battalion level and above structured joint military commissions with the former warring factions. The commissions

had a direct and immediate impact on the entire operation, both militarily and politically.

Therefore, in-depth political training (conflict resolution, mediation, negotiation, and social and political regional issues) should be clearly emphasized at these levels of command.

As pointed out by US CPT John Cobb, "our unit had a very hard time when we tried to negotiate with the Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers concerning the location and physical setting of the border-marking stones in the Sinai Peninsula.... Our unit did not have previous training in terms of advance negotiations to the level needed to reach a mutual agreement between the parties."³¹

Participating personnel (military, paramilitary, and civilians) need the experience of working together to train and exercise the capabilities they must contribute. Along this line in 1995 the US Atlantic Command and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic executed training exercises (code name "Tradewinds 95") with some Caribbean Island nations in order to promote readiness, disaster-recovery activities, counter-drug operations, and small unit tactics.³² Tradewinds 95 included, among others areas, training in:

1. Crisis mediation between two contending factions;
2. Arrangement of a cease-fire agreement;
3. Employment of a composite military and police force to monitor the cease-fire;
4. Employment of a public affairs unit;
5. Employment of a multinational joint command element; and
6. Participation in a humanitarian assistance project.

United States Lieutenant Colonel John Abizaid, a battalion commander in the Provide Comfort operation, related that his mission called for the establishment of checkpoints along major lines of communication, continuous patrolling, manning defensive positions along lines of probable Iraqi advance, and occupying covert observation posts. Thus, checkpoints became his

biggest concern. He greatly emphasized rehearsals and workshops with junior officers about what may come up in those posts. There was a lot of pressure on junior officers to make the right decisions. They were exposed to people who wanted to defect from Iraq, Kurdish guerrillas that wanted to pass through and attack the Iraqis, and other such incidents.³³ Therefore, it is key to train and retrain junior leaders in the conduct of peacekeeping operations.

“If the aim is to restore lasting peace, de-escalation is to peace operations as destroying the enemy is to war fighting.”³⁴ Building trust and confidence and restoring the noncoercive rule of law is not as easy as it is sometimes perceived. Dangerous situations may evolve. In PK scenarios, crises could be addressed using merely military skills or combat skills (interposition, checkpoints, use of force, force protection, patrolling, observation posts, military police, maneuver, and so forth), or using contact skills (investigation, mediation, conciliation, diplomacy, dynamic leadership, information strategy, facilitation of economic and social reconstruction, and so on). Interestingly enough, those skills should be mastered by potential peacekeepers and, of course, they must be the focus of any PK training program.

The Canadian Armed Forces conducted a study to answer the question of who needs “contact” or “combat” skills.³⁵ They surveyed up to 1,200 military personnel of all ranks who had participated in CANBAT 1 in Croatia and CANBAT 2 in Bosnia. Among other things they found that:

1. Soldiers need a great deal of military preparedness (combat skills) to become efficient peacekeepers.
2. The effectiveness of officers in PKOs greatly relies on the sophistication of their contact skills, especially: language for liaison duties; cultural and crisis management knowledge for communications and decision-making; and specific negotiation techniques, truce mediation (three-party), and problem solving.

WHO NEEDS SKILLS?




Figure 1

The Austrian Centre For Peace-Keeping Operations suggests that besides the traditional military training, troops should be well grounded in several other areas in order to augment the possibilities of success. These extracurricular categories may embrace first aid, communications systems and procedures, individual supply, security measures, weapons/explosives awareness, checkpoint operations, public disturbances, and so on. This tactical level instruction is crucial when small units are patrolling or policing areas with internal disputes such as in Somalia and Bosnia. Staff and senior officers, on the other hand, must emphasize training in operational methods of third-party mediation and conflict resolution, negotiation and liaison techniques, evaluation of political systems, culture, and religion in the area of deployment, terrain analysis, and orientation techniques. Others, with considerable peacekeeping experience, such as the Canadians, stress that one of the most important preparations for a peacekeeping mission is good military basic training focusing on discipline and unit cohesion³⁶ (see Figure 1).

As has been seen in Bosnia, Somalia, Cambodia, and elsewhere, understanding the local political and civilian situation becomes important at even the lowest level of command. Units

cannot rely on the higher headquarters to force intelligence about local conditions to them. Intelligence must be gathered from the bottom up using all sources available to the local commander. Task force and company/team level commanders must be able to obtain counterintelligence and civil affairs assistance. Therefore, training in information gathering and the continuous intelligence process should be reinforced in NCO, junior, and staff officers. However, this activity is not fully accepted nor practiced in U.N. operations.

In light of ongoing changes in peacekeeping missions, what are the implications for institutional training? The complexities highlighted through the range of operations, outlined in this essay, should impact the institutional training programs in the military establishment. Far from detracting from the principal focus for which armies around the world exist and train, the intricacy of these operations other than war (foreseen as dictating the whole spectrum of future military engagements) demands more training at the soldier, unit, staff, and leader levels. Leader training is required in such areas as negotiations, UN operations, integration of all services and forces, interagency operations, and operations with NGOs. Staffs and leaders in units need situational training exercises focusing on rules of engagement and problem-solving skills. Also, they must identify cultural issues, dangers unique to a region, operations with NGOs, extensive urban operations, civil disturbances, interagency operations, and so forth.

Finally, ongoing experience tells us that new global realities are shaping and in a certain way evolving as training requirement for PKOs. In our peacekeeping operation class, as part of the MMAS Program at CGSC, a group of international officers (from Germany, Norway, Denmark, Malaysia, and Philipines), with considerable experience in this subject matter, proposed a PK training program based on UN guidelines and on what they had experienced in the field. Basically, their approach outlines a training program that addresses the following subjects.

Soldier Training

Purpose: To provide training in basic PK tasks, including such aspects as:

1. Introduction to UN organizations and functions;
2. Interoperability in a multinational environment;
3. UN roles and missions;
4. Landmine operations;
5. Radio communications/transmissions;
6. First aid; and
7. Employment and tasks of UN military forces.

Unit Training

Purpose: To perform as multinational components in units or teams, regardless of the level, to:

1. Conduct checkpoints;
2. Provide relief assistance, control civil disturbances, and control supply trains;
3. Provide convoy methods and protection;
4. Mark landmined areas;
5. Conduct observation post operations;
6. Conduct patrolling techniques;

Staff Training

Purpose: To prepare trained officers for duty assignments as general staff officers in a multinational UN peacekeeping operation. The training program would include:

1. Knowledge about UN conflict control operations;
2. Planning staff duties;

3. Election supervision techniques;
4. Standing operating procedures;
5. Communications, transportation, movement control, ROE, military English;
6. UN personnel (rules and regulations);
7. UN logistic staff course;
8. Observation, monitoring, mediation, and supervising techniques;
9. Information-collection, handling the media, and reporting techniques;
10. Military police units, administration, and management;
11. Manning, staffing, and controlling UN centers;
12. International/local law; and
13. UN common language (military English)

Leadership Training

Purpose: To train senior leaders in understanding and translating UN mandates to achieve military ends, training may include:

1. UN organizations and functions;
2. Interoperability of multinational forces and services;
3. Language;
4. Diplomacy;
5. Conciliation, negotiation, mediation, culture, and knowledge of the current political situation;
6. International and local law; and
7. Military-media relationships;

Lessons That Need to Be Learned

Some learning points (mainly operational and tactical) pertinent to PKO that can be abstracted from some after-action reviews on Haiti and Bosnia. Special notice will also be given to lessons acquired from other peace operations, such as those in Somalia, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. The latter are important to review, because they were mainly manned by Latin American contingents, a topic we will later develop further.

In general, the lessons recently learned indicate the necessity of having a clearly defined strategic vision of the objectives to be accomplished (the end state) and the necessity for implementing and improving specific tasks to be performed in today's peacekeeping environment. A special report from the Strategic Study Institute of the U.S. Army War College argues that while the Army has well-established procedures for traditional peacekeeping, it is clear that today's world order demands new types of multinational peace operations. Such new tasks include reconstruction of failed states, monitoring of elections, protection of peacekeepers using predeployed or standby forces, policing countries, or delivering food. Worse of all, the line of demarcation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is now very difficult to distinguish.³⁷ Also, we have learned that warfighting skills and peace operations must become alternatives that are compatible and have symbiotic techniques that are aimed at a common goal. Togetherness and mutual cooperation between military services, governmental and nongovernmental agencies, and among participating nations guarantee success in any operation, but its absence nearly always assures failure.

Overall, many states, the US included, lack military expertise in a UN headquarters environment and will require expertise and guidance from more experienced members, especially regarding methods of improving civil affairs and psychological affairs units.³⁸ Officers must be educated about the variety of activities that may be required to be performed

during PKOs. Much more could be accomplished by establishing an efficient and effective C2 system for peacekeeping operations performed by multinational coalitions.

Lessons Learned From Haiti

Lessons learned during Operation Cooperation Nugget 95, when members of the 2d US ACR and the 1st Battalion of the British Army conducted training before deployment to Haiti, showed that units that trained for peacekeeping operations are less prepared for combat because training is focused on duties such as patrolling and manning observation points, using negotiations skills, and knowing restrictive rules of engagements that emphasize restraint. Thus, they are not well-prepared for combat.³⁹

The JTF in Haiti provided military training to Haitian forces and conducted humanitarian and civil action programs in support of Haiti's democratization. The first step in designing the training program was to determine the skills appropriate for a reformed Haitian military that excluded police functions. The objective of the training was to establish an army respected for its ability to serve and protect Haitian society rather than one feared for its ability to terrorize that society at gunpoint. Training was also given to providers of medical services, as opposed to treating patients. The multinational force included five Canadians and thirty-six Americans. The force was made up of nurses, preventive medicine technicians, general physicians, entomologists, and veterinarians.

In other instances, engineering HCA projects focused on renovating schools and medical clinics, supporting nongovernmental charitable organizations, and providing other public services. Working with the Haitian ministries of Education, Public Work, and Health, JTF civil affairs officers put together a list of eight schools and hospitals to be renovated in the Port-au-Prince area.

It is worthwhile to mention that among the problems the JTF ran into was that military personnel were permitted to ship in but not carry side arms. When the situation began to deteriorate, it was too late to reconfigure the force weapons package and to define ROE in terms of defensive-weapons capabilities with the diplomats of the US country team, the UN, and the military government of Haiti. Another side-effect was that convoys had to travel without security because the UN contingent had not been allowed to bring into Haiti sufficient personnel or weapons to protect them.

Lessons Learned From Bosnia

The vast amount of information regarding this operation could well be a Master's thesis in itself. In the view of UK Chief of Staff early remarks, peace operations such as in Bosnia and elsewhere have become more torturous. In fact, it is expected that it became much more complicated, much more messy, much more dangerous than perhaps realized." He went on to say that the UK did not go through the proper detail of military assessment or appreciation of the impending operation and thus were poorly prepared for any escalation that might result. Such a mindset "also encourages those in the political and diplomatic field to believe that such operations are an easy option; they clearly are not."⁴⁰

Commonly, the concept of "peacekeeping" is defined as operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may evolve in volatile situations. "The category concerns conflict resolution rather than conflict termination, and the preservation of impartiality remains key. And the resolution of the conflict in Bosnia was a theoretical example."⁴¹ Accordingly, the key of success for the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was careful planning and rigorous training.

Captain Fred Johnson asserts that it was critical to the success of his unit to establish a “Counter-Demonstration Workgroup” to coordinate resources and personnel to deal with civil disturbances.⁴² Within the group, there were military police, PSYOP personnel, engineers, medical personnel, chaplains, civil affairs people, and so forth. The unit censored the propaganda campaign of the warring factions before the information hit the streets. It avoided biased or erroneous press reports, thus keeping emotions from igniting. A spokesperson was designated as a liaison with radio broadcast agencies and TV stations. Meanwhile, a joint military commission was created to disseminate policy and to issue instructions to the factions on policies and procedures regarding required actions, to resolve military complaints, and to coordinate civil/military actions, and confidence-building measures. All public affair matters were coordinated through this chain with the intervention of joint commission officers. Also, through an international police task force, potential disturbances were monitored, observed, and inspected (but did not intervene) and factions were advised of the threats to peace they were provoking. In addition, “a Captain’s Incident Drill” format was established to detail all reports of situations like shots fired, group meetings, alteration of public order, and so on. This procedure served as a guide to predict the likelihood of the disturbance growing bigger, and what resources would be needed if the confrontation escalated, and to alert allied units and local authorities.

As Major Mark Dickens pointed out, a poorly handled civil disturbance can quickly escalate out of control with potentially long-term negative effects for the mission, not to mention potential loss of life.⁴³ IFOR helped local officials ensure the safety of their citizens, provided general military security, and facilitated negotiations. With the International Police Task Force (IPTF) the IFOR also participated in separating warring factions and disarming the Ministry of Interior Police. While doing that an unruly mob formed, beat an IPTF officer, destroyed

vehicles, trapped IPTF officers inside the local police station, and threatened the IFOR unit. The major recalled the situation as dangerous and rapidly escalating out of control. The experience led this unit to develop a more successful strategy. Some of the techniques developed to subdue uncontrolled mobs in Bosnia follow:⁴⁴

1. Isolation: Hot spots should be isolated in time and space. In Bosnia the acting unit quickly set up a ring of checkpoints around Mahala to limit and control access while other unit screened the flanks (preferably helicopter units).
2. Domination: The situation must be controlled by means of force presence and control of information resources.
3. Maintaining Common Situational Awareness: This requires assets that enable timely, accurate, complete, and multisource reporting.
4. Employing Multidimensional, Multiecheloned Actions: While a unit handled local security at Mahala, the task force headquarters focused its efforts on a larger tactical and political spectrum.

It was also key in Bosnia to employ interpreters to conduct negotiations. Leaders at all levels had to have the ability to enforce a UN mandate, for example, by discussions, mediation, or assistance, which required as much skills from junior officers as from diplomats. For instance, junior British officers often confronted Serbian checkpoint commanders and had to assert the right of free passage for UN convoys. The situation was no different in Kurdistan; it was not uncommon for US officers to negotiate with both Iraqi and Kurd leaders in attempts to separate warring factions and to enforce boundaries. Usually, in these cases, senior leaders were far away and junior leaders, armed only with their good sense and (hopefully) accurate translators, were required to diffuse numerous potentially dangerous situations.⁴⁵

“Versatility of the leader” to adapt to the situation at hand was another important learning point. The battalion commander of the 4th Bn 67th Arm Bde, as part of the peacekeeping force in Bosnia, encouraged his officers and soldiers to project an air of confidence and professionalism to the public, to which the local population responded. As months passed, people’s psychology changed from a war syndrome to a more peacetime-like lifestyle. The commander noted that a sense of freedom increased and children again began playing in the playgrounds in his area of responsibility. They were no longer afraid, but got out of their cars at checkpoints and greeted soldiers as friends.

When the battalion arrived, people were skeptical and afraid. They were uncertain of what the force was doing there. “We worked hard to make them know we would not cause any harm, rather we were there to help them.”⁴⁶ However, there was some dissension. 1st Lt Matthew A. Dooley, XO of Co C, narrated that when they were patrolling on very narrow roads using M1s, locals became, and showed, their discomfort. “We were basically destroying their city the same way their foes did.”⁴⁷

It is definitely important to have the right mindset and skills to address antagonistic perceptions of a host nation’s inhabitants. And it is extremely paramount to military leaders and observers to build mutual trust, work in harmony, and achieve the goals that intervening forces and local populace uphold.

Lessons Learned From Somalia

In peace operations under Chapter VII (peace enforcement), as in Somalia, the UN may authorize the “use of all necessary means to establish as soon as possible, a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.”⁴⁸ The tragic incidents that happened in Somalia illustrate the reason why the use of force is authorized and what may occur in this type of peace

operations. The leaders of the warring factions initially convened to negotiate but at the street level and at checkpoints, UN intervention was not understood nor accepted or even respected. A large portion of the confronting parties were under arms, conducting sabotage actions against UN forces, ambushing and killing soldiers, and using women and children as human shields.

The UN Secretary General, however, believed that success in securing long-term peace in Somalia was directly tied to disarming warlords, political factions, and destroying or removing mines from the country. Therefore, one of the key concerns of the UNOSOM II Force Commander was the degree to which the force could maintain pressure on the warlords to continue the political reconciliation process. Thus, he directed his staff members to maintain contact and negotiate with the warring factions.

His next important concern was to continue disarmament and cease-fire operations in a firm but diplomatic fashion. Not everything went as easily and smoothly as planned. Reportedly, on 7 May 1993, a band of approximately 150 armed men attacked the city of Kismayo where they engaged elements of the Belgian Parachute Battalion. As a result, a Belgian was severely wounded and approximately 40 Somalis were either killed or wounded. A Pakistani convoy was ambushed by Somalis firing automatic and antitank weapons. The unit suffered heavy casualties and only a small squad was able to escape from the ambush killing zone. In another instance, in the interior of Mogadishu a Pakistani platoon was overrun by a crowd of women and children supported by militia in overwatching positions. During this engagement, Somalis used these women and children to press in on the soldiers. The women and children grabbed the weapons and prevented soldiers from firing in self-defense. Soldiers were then struck down with knives and machetes. Somali snipers prevented soldiers from escaping, killing 23 Pakistanis and wounding 75 UN soldiers.

The US Institute of Peace argues that the real lesson learned in Somalia is that “preventive diplomacy” must come into wider and more expert use.⁴⁹ It is important not only to identify potential threats of conflict but to shape forms of early intervention-negotiation, mediation, formal or informal diplomacy, and so on. There must be an unambiguous policy regarding the use of force. Therefore, the rules of engagement should be along classical military lines rather than the traditional UN approach of firing only in self-defense. Delegating and localizing authority and flexibility to people on the ground can exponentially increase the efficiency of operations and avoid costly mistakes. This was not the case in Somalia. The civilian UN representatives and the force commander had to consult every time with headquarters in New York. Waiting for answers about what to do next delayed actions and reactions to unexpected events as they happened on the field.

The complexity of carrying out the humanitarian operation in Somalia is, appropriately believed to be what will be inherent in future MOOTW engagements. In Somalia, the US led ARFORs mission was to conduct operations geared to providing security for operations in support of the relief effort. The intent was to ensure that relief supplies could get to those who needed them. Then, the commander directed his staff to plan and execute operations to monitor lines of communications and to provide security for the storage and distribution of relief supplies. Though it was not the initial mission, military units were required to perform activities such as revitalizing local government and security forces, rebuilding and repairing schools and orphanages, teaching English in schools, building and repairing roads, and other such tasks. These unpredicted activities were undertaken in addition to removing mines, disarming warring factions, and remaining fully capable of launching a sudden and full-scale combat operation.

Individual soldiers and units found it difficult to determine who or what was the enemy. Nonetheless, capable leadership and well-trained professional soldiers, while acting with

compassion and restraint, ensured that each mission was accomplished. Those characteristics, “compassion and restraint,” are fundamental pillars to the success of any humanitarian or PK operation. Distinct from traditional military operations, external coordination with non-governmental organizations (NGOs and PVOs) appears to be essential to success. Most provide unique types of relief; many provide more than one service. A civil-military operation center was created to coordinate and share intelligence information with NGOs and PVOs.

Moreover, coordination with and support of logistic contracting agencies resulted in the success of coalition operations. Force protection was also restructured and given a major role to reduce risky life situations expected from ungoverned groups of bandits surrounding the area of operations. Finally, information dissemination became an important element to reach the Somali people to inform them about where units were providing food and medical attention.

Communications means included print media, radio, interpreters, and liaison with elders in each community.

Army leaders at all levels conducted negotiations and informal discussions with Somalis on many issues besides local government. Negotiation skills were tested during direct negotiation with local warring clans and factions.

United States Major General S. L. Arnold strongly opposed those who suggested that these new environments and missions would deteriorate warfighting skills because of the dissimilarities of the two kinds of activities. He argued that the missions recently encountered are preparing soldiers, units, and leaders for possible future military engagements. It is perhaps, illogical to think that when an infantryman is tasked to oversee a food distribution line in a hostile environment that the results will be smooth. Troops will need special training to accomplish such missions. Indeed, infantry units in Somalia conducted humanitarian operations and flexibly shifted from assisting refugees and performing nation assistance tasks to conducting

combat operations. Nonetheless, military leaders should bear in mind that such versatility can only be attained in a highly trained and professional Army. Military forces in Somalia also conducted combat operations in urban areas (day and night), provided security for humanitarian agencies, operated checkpoints and road blocks, conducted cordon and search missions, conducted patrols, and performed convoy security operations.

However, there was an issue that significantly affected every contingent involved in this operation, especially for the US troops and field-leadership. At issue were the public complaints from both soldiers and high-ranking officers that peace enforcement duties were inappropriate for light infantry units (such as the 10th Mountain Division). The 10th Mountain Division's mission was to prevent acts of violence and to protect lives in a chaotic environment. Many times, they found themselves caught in a dilemma of being unable to prevent such acts or to impose their will over the rebels because they lacked the means to coercibly and convincingly subdue their opponents. Reportedly, in the case of the Pakistani forces, they were unable to rescue some comrades trapped by belligerents who were threatening to kill the soldiers. Lack of training was another issue for such units.⁵⁰

Without ground mobility superior to the Somalis, US forces could not perform the mission efficiently. It is believed that the correct structural organization to match peace enforcement complexity is a task force composed of Rangers and armor, or armored cavalry, along with military police and other units. Another recommendation was to assign balanced units with significant military police to such missions.

In the view of Reserve BG Raymond Bell (observing the international scenario and the fact that the US is more frequently involved in such engagements) the creation of an appropriate force structure to accommodate peace-enforcement situations "is neither illusionary nor an impractical concept."⁵¹ He also argues that the inclusion of National Guardsmen and Army

Reserve will be essential to enhancing the capabilities of such PE task forces. The National Guard's Army Reserve possesses excellent peace operations capabilities, such as civil affair commands, PSYOP groups, an MP mind-set, and regional focus.⁵²

Lessons Learned from ONUCA PKO

In this case the scope will be limited to some of the major problems and contributions of the involvement of Latin American military forces. Then key events detailed by Jack Child in one of his papers examining the Inter-American Military System (IAMS) and its role in peacekeeping operations will be examined.⁵³ This was the first ever UN peacekeeping mission in the Western Hemisphere. However, the main negotiating burden was carried by the ad hoc group of states called "Contadora." However, the Contadora were found to lack experience in dealing with peace processes. Therefore, the UN General Assembly and Canadian staff and military personnel assisted them in the endeavor. ONUCA was essentially a traditional border-observation peacekeeping mission which later expanded to oversee the demobilization of the Contras using a battalion of Venezuelan paratroopers. It was initially successful in resettling the Contras to CIAV-OAS.

The Latin American military involvement in ONUCA was perceived as substantial. Besides the more than 700 Venezuelan paratroopers, there were military observers from Brazil, Ecuador, Canada, Colombia, Spain, and Venezuela. Argentina contributed with four fast patrol boats and thirty navy personnel to monitor the Gulf of Fonseca (the common border area of Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador).

Most of the Latin officers had no prior peacekeeping experience. Other ONUCA forces, such as Canada, were more experienced but were in a distinctly different cultural, geographic, and political environment. Language was a major impediment in this operation. The chief

military observer (commander) was a Spanish major general. Hence the working language was Spanish instead of military English, which is the traditional UN peacekeeping language. Cultural differences also created friction and misunderstandings. Canadian and other European officers claimed that their Latin American counterparts were reluctant to communicate incidents because doing so would make them look inefficient or unsuitable. Latin American officers would retaliate by saying that their non-Hispanic colleagues did not understand the realities of the Central American environment. Reportedly, the diverse cultures among the contingents (the Canadians and Europeans and the Venezuelan, Spanish, and Argentinians) caused them to splinter into two separated groups.

In terms of the UN command and control structure, there was a parallel informal chain of command within each national contingent. When a special circumstance popped up, officers would make sure their senior national representative knew their side of the story before the “official” UN position was communicated. Logistical problems were also significant. Although, the UN field operation structure is set up to handle logistics and other support, it also relied on individual national support. Latin American contingents were deployed lacking communications assets, transportation, lodging, medical, and financial support. For instance, the Venezuelan paratrooper battalion showed up carrying only basic weapons and personal effects. Organic communications equipment and vehicles were abruptly searched for and unwillingly provided. Finally, there was perceived a biased attitude and a certain partiality toward the Contras and against the FSLN and FMLN, which was contrary to “their expected neutrality” and impartiality as “third-party peacekeepers.”⁵⁴ Even though some particularities of this report might be challenged, what should operationally be taken from it is that circumstances, such as cultural and language clashes as well as experience and divergent military procedures, might diminish the successful accomplishment of a given peacekeeping operation.

Lessons Learned from ONUSAL PKO

Being an offshoot of ONUCA, the ONUSAL's main focus was a human rights and peace-observing mission.⁵⁵ As with ONUCA, ONUSAL involved the demobilization of guerrilla movements (the FMLN and the Contras). However, since the Salvadorian peace process involved a major restructuring of its military apparatus, there was a noticeable anti-USONAL sentiment. Note that as opposed to ONUCA, ONUSAL did not need a battalion-size unit to persuade the forces to demobilize; it relied on a small group of military observers.

Once again, the contribution of the Latin American military establishment (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) was significant alongside traditional peacekeeping participants. The ONUCA experience was preponderant in the sense that in ONUSAL there was not much friction among the traditional and Latin American contingents. Special mention should be made that in this case UN forces actively participated in the disbandment of the corrupted Salvadorian police establishment and helped retrain a new police force. Though the operation ran smoothly, there was some criticism regarding the final makeup of the new police force (which was trained by Guyanan, Chilean, and Mexican forces and some harsh remarks about the human rights background of some of the observers from various Latin American countries).

Other Lessons We Need to Learn

As stated in Chapter 2, Methodology, a survey was given to 95 percent of the international officers attending the 1996-1997 CGSC class. The majority of these officers are first-hand, experienced peacekeepers. Many of them have received a vast amount of peace operation training under NATO and UN auspices. Consequently, their insights were found to be

extremely meaningful in achieving the goals of my research. The following paragraphs discuss some key findings from the survey (which is reproduced in Appendix B):

Question No. 6. After you received your peacekeeping mission what type of special training in “peacekeeping” did you receive before your deployment?” Ninety percent of the respondents received UN-like unit training. They all agreed that more training in peacekeeping duties is needed, especially since peacekeeping is evolving so rapidly.

Question No. 11. “Identify the causes of tension and difficulty in conducting missions associated with societal issues.” Ninety percent of the respondents agree with the premise that “language” was a great blocking factor or, at least, slows down normal activities at peacekeeping sites. Language differences cause difficulties in relationships with natives, impose the need for interpreters to fulfill law enforcement tasks, and hinders interfacing at low echelons (soldiers and NCOs), especially, when they try to interact with locals, give directions, or relate regulations. “Culture, religion, and racism” were all regarded as success stoppers. Officers and troops assigned to the Middle East soon realized (on site) the severity of their lack of knowledge about Islamic culture and religion belief. Respondents stated that on many occasions they were shocked by the way of living of these people and by their laws and social rules. It took a while for the peackeepers to adjust. Finally, African officers and contingents deployed in former Yugoslavia observed “race” as a hampering factor in performing peace operations. Their presence was not seen amicably by local east Europeans. The Africans said that when they arrived their skin color caused dissension among the local populace and complicated negotiations with warring factions. Coping with this “problem,” and thus attaining conditions to perform, commanding officers of these troops had to be patient, mature, and restrained, ignoring verbal aggression, showing neutrality, and being friendly. The bottom line is that “cultural,

environment, and religious awareness" must be taken into consideration and be part of the subjects taught in UN training before deployment.

Question No. 13. "Were the Rules of Engagements (ROE) clearly defined and understood? One-hundred percent of those questioned responded that the ROE were simple; that is, the use of weapons were restrained except for self-defense. Nevertheless, 45 percent asserted that after undergoing constant harassment and attacks, the ROEs changed to exhibit a more aggressive posture. They also suggested that in light of the nature of the environments in which PKOs are being conducted, now and in the future, there is a need for a strong deterrent force in support of peacekeeping efforts.

Question No. 14. "In your experience, what are the most common duties requested during peacekeeping missions? Ninety-eight percent of the respondents agreed that the most common tasks are:

1. Military Police.
2. Maintaining public order.
3. Weapons control.
4. Feeding starving people.
5. Border patrol.
6. Separating warring factions.
7. Traffic control.
8. Public disturbances.
9. Providing security and protection to food facilities.
10. Face-to-face meeting with local authorities.
11. Truce supervision.
12. Security to airfields and port facilities and operations.

13. Joint patrolling.

14. Refugee control

Question No. 15. "Which type of soldier performs better in peacekeeping missions?" Sixty-five percent concurred with the thought that professional soldiers are the best choice. Twenty-five percent agreed with having volunteers. Ten percent stated that conscripts are capable of doing a fine job as long as they have sensible, UN-like unit training. Therefore, ninety percent of the respondents considered that because of the puzzling nature of PKOs, it is advisable to employ professional soldiers or volunteers (mature people).

Question No. 16. "What do you think will be the extent of requirements for peacekeeping operations for the near- and long-term future?" The answers to this question were really open-ended. Nonetheless respondents agreed on a mainstream body of thoughts.

Overall they believe:

1. Peacekeeping requirements in the future will be broader.
2. Peacekeeping will be multinational in nature.
3. Refugees will keep on being an issue demanding PK operations.
4. Peace enforcement will be in even more demand than will PK operations, although it will require PKO follow-on efforts.
5. Peacekeeping requirements will not remain the same. They will be more complex, thus less easy to address.

Other aspects on which respondents agreed and concurred with several other authors was that these operations do not demand purely military skills. They also require compassion, restraint, and skills to interface with local populace and culture. Therefore, soldiers like the Russian Internal Troops, Venezuelan National Guard, and German Special Divisions fit the need for engagements in complex missions such as peacekeeping. German Lieutenant Colonel H. J.

Feldman explained that since his country has a conscription system that lasts merely ten months, its soldiers are not as efficient as they should be for this kind of job. Hence, the German government has opted for creating two division-strength units with voluntary professional soldiers to cope with peacekeeping challenges. The units Germany sent to Bosnia were composed of such soldiers, and they achieved better results.

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CHAPTER 4

POLICY AND APPROACHES TOWARD PEACEKEEPING

This chapter addresses the diversity of policies and viewpoints held by one vastly experienced peacekeeping country (Canada) and two newcomers (Russia and the US). It is essential for this analysis to examine these countries because of their current robust peacekeeping involvement. We will also survey the commitment to peacekeeping operations of the leading Latin American military establishments. In this survey, we will look at the opinions of policymakers, practitioners, the military, and scholars.

The Canadian View and Policy Toward Peacekeeping

Addressing the 1997 CGSC Class, a high ranking Canadian officer and former Commander of the UN PK forces deployed in Rwanda, said that the Canadian government is acting and adapting its policy toward peacekeeping at the same pace that global situations have been evolving. The Canadians have been involved in operations other than war since the mid-fifties. Their approach is to continue in that direction. However, Canada, is also showing a shifting movement toward peacebuilding. He added that this thought is shared by many Canadian general officers, although there are some reservations in terms of early deployment or actions before crisis escalation. There are also concerns about the UN's management capabilities in such crises. To date, the tempo of Canadian engagements in PKOs has increased 80 percent. This is significant when we realize that Canada maintains a small military apparatus. For instance, the General recalled, when he surveyed one of his units, he found that soldiers with

four years in the Army had already had up to three tours in the former Yugoslavia. According to General Dalier there are three options when handling critical situations: UN crisis management, coalition crisis management, or doing nothing. The first two options do not work well because nations always try to be sure their commitment will serve their own national interests.

Concerned nations should not give up in improving their efficiency. On a "moral basis," we should never remain uninvolved and do nothing in the face of such crisis as the massacre that took place in Rwanda. Key Western nations need to keep investing in technological gadgetry to maximize their capabilities to provide and/or impose peace.

Physical environmental factors as well as societal phenomenon are key issues to bear in mind when deciding the deployment of military forces to a PKO or humanitarian assistance theater. In Africa commanders had to deal with diseases, cultural clashes, and the moral dilemma of endangering their troops by sending them to help people with high rates of AIDS or malaria (such as in Rwanda).

Overpopulation and extreme poverty also constitute potential peacekeeper threats. Thousands of youths were abandoned. They had nothing to eat, and there was no work for them. Therefore, they became easy prey for local leaders who lured and indoctrinated them according to their own hidden agendas. Because of the effects of hatreds, ethnic, drugs, ruthlessness and brutality characterized such scenarios. People in Rwanda were told to look for protection in churches. The opposing warring faction would wait until churches were packed and then massacred the church goers by hundreds. We need to learn from this that extra training is required and that the ROE must be more flexible to allow commanders to react accordingly in intra-theater situations which sometimes appear difficult to be assimilated from New York (UN HQ).¹ Finally, General Dalier asserted that "like it or not" peacekeeping is becoming a core activity to be performed by the US and other leading nations of the Western world.

In spite of a long standing PK experience, Canadians suffered a major setback when one of their units, while deployed in Somalia, got involved in highly publicized incidents, including the torture-murder of a Somali teenager by Canadians troops. There were also allegations of black marketeering and fraud among soldiers while in Bosnia.² In this regard, Canadian General Dalier suggests that “moral individual strength in soldiers, NCOs, and officers must be a preponderant requisite for military personnel” being chosen in such international enterprises.

There is so much at stake.

In another example of Canadian PK maturity, LTG Maurice Baril, a three-tour veteran in UN peace operations and currently the Commander of the Canadian Land Force Command, explained that in the last several years most of the PKO casualties, have resulted from landmines. Thus they began adding armor kits on all vehicles in Yugoslavia. Although PK logistic requirements are not the general’s only concern, it certainly will be key in his agenda.

Finally, besides being convinced that peacekeeping is a widespread philosophy and practice in their armed forces, top players in the Canadian military establishment also think that there are some problems in the UN when managing crises. This may be a result of the international community’s denial of more support to the UN. However, there must be a quicker UN response to crises to prevent more occurrences of such catastrophic events as in Rwanda. Also, mandates should contain militarily achievable missions and a clear end state.

The US Viewpoint and Policy Toward Peacekeeping

According to the National Security Strategy (NSS) of February 1996, the US is willing to employ its military forces in peace operations abroad (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and other operations in support of these objectives). Along with other nations, the US is committed to trying to prevent and contain localized conflicts before they require a military response. The

document also adds that peacekeeping operations are an important component of US strategy, because they provide breathing room for fledgling democracies, as in Cambodia, El Salvador, and Namibia. The US goal is to help preserve peace between nations, as in Cyprus, the Golan Heights, and along the Peruvian and Ecuadorian borders. It is clear that this policy is being applied in several scenarios around the world, and it will continue to be so as long as such operations are desirable and justified by US national interests and meet preestablished standards of military employment.³

Concurrent with the NSS, the National Military Strategy (NMS) outlines US policy stating that global interdependency coupled with US worldwide security interests require a more active and prepared armed force to assist in security or humanitarian efforts.⁴ The NSS also outlines that US forces will remain prepared to support peacekeeping operations on a case-to-case basis, as well to participate in counterdrug, humanitarian, and counterterrorism operations.

Since 1990, the involvement of the US in multinational peacekeeping has been persistently more frequent. But, it has been challenged on different grounds and subjected to intense debates. In fact, nobody agrees with a thorough US involvement policy. House Budget Committee Chairman, John R. Kesich (R-Ohio), for example, criticized the US deployment to Bosnia saying that only Europeans should be involved. Likewise, Senate Majority Leader Don Nickles (R-Okla) expressed concerns saying that such missions could turn into "nation-building," which would prolong their stay.⁵ In 1993, an interagency review upheld the decision to shape the scope of peacekeeping operations by formulating Presidential Decision Directive No. 25 (PDD-25). It includes a series of questions the administration is to address before undertaking any PK obligation.

The Clinton administration has emphasized the right and ability of the US to refuse to participate in operations that do not serve the U.S. interests.⁶ Although, there is not a clear

consensus regarding such US interests, there is the belief that if the US decreases its commitment to peacekeeping more countries would look out for their own narrowly defined interests and, possibly, pursue the use of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, peacekeeping operations can serve as a preventive tool to preclude large-scale military operations or to increase a state's sense of security, thereby serving US nonproliferation and promoting stability. Also, the US envisions its participation as part of a multinational commitment so participating states would share the costs and risks that accompany peacekeeping operations.⁷

Notwithstanding the existence of a certain areas considered vital to US interests (such as defense of the homeland, access to oil, security of lines of communications, or securing lives of US citizens abroad), the new policy would include support efforts to protect broader US interests, such as the sanctity of other countries' borders, response to mass humanitarian disasters, and the promotion of democracy. However, the PDD-25 outlines stricter standards (Table 1) when US personnel are likely to be involved in combat operations while providing peacekeeping.

Table 1
U.S. Peace Operations Policy guidance

Factors for Supporting Peace Operations	Factors for Participating in Peace Operations	Factors for Participating When Operation Will Likely Involve Combat
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multilateral involvement advances US interests - International interest in dealing with problem multilaterally - Conflict represents threat to or breach of international peace and security - Operation has clear objectives - For traditional peacekeeping operation, ceasefire is in place - For peace enforcement operation, significant threat to international peace and security - Forces, financing, and appropriate mandate are available - Inaction judged to result in unacceptable political humanitarian, and economic consequences - Operation's duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Participating advances U.S. interests - Risks to American personnel considered acceptable - Personnel funds, and other resources are available - U.S. participation deemed necessary for operation's success - Role of U.S. forces tied to clear objectives - Endpoint of U.S. participation can be identified - U.S. public and U.S. Congress support operation - Command and control arrangements are acceptable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Clear determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives - Plan to achieve objectives decisively - Commitment to reassess or adjust size composition, and disposition of forces if necessary

The US policy, as stated in PDD-25, also recommends reforms in the way the UN is handling the participating contingents, how objectives are defined, and how missions are conducted overall. For instance, the US believes that the UN has not properly or adequately used the intelligence provided to it. This is crucial given the complexity and hazardous missions faced by the international community. The UN should look for ways to improve its ability to manage civilian and humanitarian affairs. It is critical to efficiently coordinate and oversee the efforts of humanitarian groups and their resources, otherwise actions will keep on being redundant and overlapping. In terms of command and control, the US has constantly stated its position that it will not relinquish overall command authority of US troops. It will, however, place forces under the operational control of a foreign commander when it serves US interests.

In late 1996, President Clinton decided to keep US troops in Bosnia eight months past the first departure date.⁸ This sent the message that this administration is interested in a vigorous involvement in global hot spots, arguing that the world's last superpower has a duty to prevent a new outbreak of war in the Balkans and head off widespread disease and famine in Central Africa. President Clinton said that, though downsizing the contingent to 8,500 soldiers, US presence was vital to help shape the fragile peace in that country ravaged by ethnic warfare. Along these lines, the director of the DIA stated before a Congressional Hearing, that pulling forces from Bosnia's peacekeeping sites would lead to a renewal of conflict. Defense Secretary William Perry acknowledged that "it is very, very important that we stay in there and finish the job. . . . And US troops would really be withdrawn as predicted by mid-1988."⁹

Widespread media coverage in November 1996 indicated that from 12,000 to 15,000 starving refugees were crossing from Zaire to Rwanda every hour, leaving behind a trail of death and sickness. The Clinton administration immediately responded by announcing that the US

would send 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers to support the multinational efforts to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The White House also announced that US troops would take part in a four-month-long effort involving as many as 15,000 troops from a dozen nations and led by a Canadian Commander with a US officer as his deputy.¹⁰

Concurring with today's trends and current US policy and recognizing the complexities, it appears that the US will continue to actively deploy forces abroad pursuant to peacekeeping commitments, although, this will remain an option primarily as part of a multilateral peace operation. More conflicts and troublesome international environments will be seen in years to come. The US tendency will be to broaden even more its national interests and allies. It is easy to see that in the future US military involvement to attain national objectives will continue. However, the US is urging, as condition to its willingness to support future operations, that the UN be more effective in planning, managing, coordinating, commanding and controlling future operations.

The Russian View and Policy Toward Peacekeeping

According to Colonel-General, Eduard A. Vorob'yev, a former Defense Minister of Russia, peacekeeping for his country has been elevated to the level of national policy. Russia views participation in international peacekeeping activity as an element of its foreign policy and of its national security policy. Just recently, the Security Council of the Russian Federation approved as military doctrine that--

Russia will assist in the efforts of the world community and the various organs of collective security for the prevention of wars and armed conflicts, peacekeeping and peace-restoration, and, for this purpose, considers it essential to maintain armed and other forces for conducting peacekeeping operations in accordance with the UN Security Council or in keeping with international circumstances.¹¹

During the TRADOC Peacekeeping Conference, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Colonel Vladimir I. Krysenko asserted that Russians are prepared to continue to share their peacekeeping experience and to broaden cooperation in the peacekeeping arena between his military system and bilateral contacts and within a UN, CSCE, or NACC framework.¹²

In analyzing the philosophy and practice under which Russians execute peacekeeping operations, we may notice certain divergent paths in respect to what we may think about a traditionally peace engagement. In the “near abroad,” those operations were undertaken by a third party (or a coalition of forces) to resolve a conflict between two or more opposing sides. It is the Russian’s understanding that a PKO is an attempt to force conflicting sides to stop bloodshed and find a diplomatic solution to their contention. Apparently, Russians believe it is dangerous and, perhaps, immoral to wait until the combatants agree to the intervention of a third party to help them resolve their differences. To Russian leadership, peacekeeping or rather peace enforcement (as it may be understood following the UN doctrine),

It is not a mandate by an international organization, nor is it impartial in the strict meaning of the word. It includes, moreover, as a rule, an enforcement element, which is alien to classical peacekeeping. It reflects Russians claims of a “special responsibility” to maintain stability on the territory of the former Soviet Union.¹³

General A. F. Arinakhin, Commandant of the Russian Peacekeeping Forces Training Center, commented that if Russia had waited until a cease-fire was established or until it had received approval from the UN before undertaking peacekeeping actions in the former Soviet Union (FSU), the conflict would have spread and become uncontrollable. Likewise, in the outlook of General Vorob’ev, Russia would act as the “authoritative umpire” in resolving disputes among the republics of the FSU.¹⁴

Note, also, that within the peculiarities of the roles and missions of Russian peacekeeping forces, such personnel have immunity from criminal, civil, and administrative

responsibilities in their oral and written declarations and in the actions they take in their official capacity. This immunity continues in effect even after personnel cease to be members of the peacekeeping group or cease service in it.

Lately, though it seem, that the Russian approach to peacekeeping might be moving a bit more to the Western world's peacekeeping ideology. Recently, it has been learned that the new Russian Minister of Defense, General Igor Rodionov "plans a smaller, highly trained, modern army" to be available in a short-term period. He suggested that the current ill-trained, unpaid, starving army was in part a result of the fiasco of getting in and out of the war against the separatist republic of Chechnya. He added that the Russian Army must avoid contingency operations abroad that would thwart the ongoing reform. Rodionov's goal is to have an affordable (since Russia is suffering woeful financial constraints), deployable, and expandable force. This plan, which envisions a ten-year maturation, has been masterminded by Rodionov. If he survives the upcoming change of national leadership (possibly soon in light of President Yeltsin's health problems), it is speculated that more likely than not, Rodionov will keep his job and reform could certainly materialize. Thus, the implementation of such plans may eventually lead Russia to once again become a strong and competent military leader.¹⁵

Finally, the reform package includes alteration of the way Russians perform peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions and encourage its integration/participation in regional security alliances. Also, force projection and dissemination along regional lines is predictable.

Russian Internal Troops (VVMVD)

Interestingly enough, the Russian government has created a separate military organization to deal with internal security and peacekeeping issues both internally and in near-

abroad nations. Colonel-General Anatoly Kulikov is the commander of this organization, which consists of nearly 234,000 men. Their training is similar to that of traditional armed forces ground troops, albeit they specialize in restoring civil order and in other such internal situations. The VVMVD is organized into motorized battalions and divisions. Initially, among other tasks, its mission was to operate the Russian prison system.¹⁶

The force's current mission is to provide stability or "peace" through military operations to create conditions favorable for conducting diplomatic and political negotiations. Among other key responsibilities, they are to maintain order and security within the country, which includes peace operation missions. Second, this force is in charge of guarding main governmental buildings and strategic objectives. Last, but not least, the force is responsible for territorial defense during wartime. In the commander's view, the internal troops mission is vital to his nation and to near-abroad neighbors.

The focus of the VVMVD today is on maintaining stability in areas of ethnic unrest within the country and maintaining public order. For this new type of engagement its soldiers need special training in law-enforcement skills, since up to 80 percent of their tasks are police-related activities. Training includes crowd control; hostage rescue capabilities; convoy security; evacuation drills; and control of traffic, road blocks, and strong points; close combat; and special weapon training.

By using force of arms to provide domestic security, Russian internal troops have become a "civilized force factor" employing nontraditional military operations (such as MOOTW), forcing people to live in a civilized way, and resolving differences with as little bloodshed as possible. To Colonel Tsygankov, countering and preventing extremism and alleviating its consequences are now among the most important challenges of the international community. But, it is impossible to eliminate poverty and preserve the environment without

safeguarding “peace” both regionally and internationally. That is why the mission of this force is intended to deliver peace in this diverse world through means other than traditional use of force. And the underlying difference between traditional and nontraditional operations, is that in nontraditional operations “the goal is to stop someone, who is blinded by hatred, from becoming a mass murderer-- to stop an extremist, but not an enemy.”¹⁷ Here, there is not an enemy, but the conflict per se.

In summary, on the one hand the internal troops are being used by Russia as a mean to deliver “peace” in the same sense as UN peacekeeping forces do; that is, carrying out operations with international forces but without applying the pressure of force. Note that cooperation and mutual assistance with the conflicting sides is a mandatory condition for carrying out the assigned mission. In other words, local authorities create conditions for troop actions, and the troop acts in behalf of restoring peace. For practical purposes the internal troops have no heavy weapons. Therefore, like UN peacekeeping forces they receive only defensive weapons to use in self-defense and for countering the armed attempts of warring factions that try to hamper or otherwise interfere with the fulfillment of the mission. In other instances, they just rely on their presence and on moral pressure, to ensure compliance to political agreements rather than in military might.¹⁸

“Prejudice” is highly discouraged in peacekeeping operations. But for Russians, they insist this does not mean a blind neutrality or inertia. In fact, what it entails is an active intent not to permit actions that infringe on the rights of either party. The nature of this type of nontraditional operation embraces monitoring cease fires, providing security for the delivery of humanitarian aid, assisting of local authorities in establishing law and order, and preventing violations of constitutional guaranteed rights.

On the other hand, internal troops PKO actions include forceful combat and special operations such as detaining dangerous individuals and armed criminals; suppressing mass disturbances in populated areas and in penal facilities; freeing hostages; taking back captured buildings, structures, facilities, transport equipment, and land; disarming illegal armed groups and seizing their weapons, ammunition, combat hardware, explosives, and other military property; searching for and detaining trespassers of important state facilities, and so on.¹⁹ Accordingly, this force factor is the exception to the rule. What is clear is that internal troops can be used in many different ways to achieving peace.

Latin American Approach to UN Peacekeeping Operations

Introduction

The new world order which triggered the demise of the Soviet Union coupled with other ongoing malaise around the world, entangled the current global security environment. No longer are governments confronted with clear threats. Rather, fear of the unknown and uncertainty have replaced clear cut battle lines and, increasingly, localized conflicts have become more important. To curb this odd and hostile backlash, nations and international organizations have come together to search for underlying causes of such feuds in order to peacefully mitigate suffering and avoid death. Individual nations basically have resorted to such arrangements as enhancing democratic principles, maintaining global and regional collective security, and conducting peace operations and humanitarian relief efforts. Such arrangements ultimately pursue the peaceful termination of conflicts, thus somehow alleviating their domestic and regional adversity.

Among such diplomatic settlements, peacekeeping is one of the most hailed and more practiced international arrangement. Truly, its characteristics makes it the course of action of choice. It is seen as being both, politically correct and widely acceptable. This study analyzes

why the majority of Latin American (LA) nations welcome peacekeeping initiatives as opposed to peace enforcement.

Pursuant to a distinct rationale, which varies from country to country, the LA military establishment has consistently shown a positive posture before these kinds of initiatives, either under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) or the Organization of American States (OAS). Of course, there may well be exceptions. Note, however, that nations have been skeptical about such interventions when they have not been agreed on by host nations or when such requests involve merely combat operations abroad.

The Latin American Military System

For the larger military establishments of Latin America, UN peacekeeping represents a significant, although secondary, role. Those countries with the notable exception of Mexico, have consistently supported most of the major peacekeeping operations. Such Latin America commitment has accelerated in the past few years as the UN has taken a more activist and interventionist stance in the PK arena. For instance, Argentina has extended its peacekeeping role by deploying units (of battalion-size) to participate in UN peace enforcement missions.²⁰ Reportedly, over the years, the Latin American military establishment's contribution to PKOs and peace-observing missions has almost reached the same levels of allocation of main traditional troop contributors (Scandinavian countries, Ireland, New Zealand, India, and Canada) and well above that of most of the UN membership.

Since 1989, the Inter-American Military System (IAMS) has been significantly more prominent in UN peace missions. Some statistical data indicate that in 1990 the UN deployed 1,060 men throughout the planet of which up to 800 were from a Venezuelan paratrooper battalion. The UN Secretary General praised this unit for its performance and declared "it had

served with distinction.”²¹ Until 1994 the IAMS had up to 2, 816 personnel serving in 13 distinct peacekeeping locations.

During the II Conference of Ministers of Defense of the Americas in Argentine, 32 countries participated and in the Declaration of San Carlos de Bariloche, agreed on the need for interdependency for regional peace and several other key military issues.²² Delegations emphasized and agree on the urgent necessity for more in-depth cooperation to maintain peace in the Inter-American System and to reinforce hemispherical security. Delegates urged member nations to actively endorse UN peacekeeping operations by actually participating in them. The Argentinean delegation even offered the use of the facilities of its “Centro de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz” (CAECOPAZ) for training of multinational military units.

The National Defense University points out that the Argentinean government has lately lately increased its military role in international missions. In fact, Argentina manifested its willingness by establishing a regional peacekeeping center. That is currently fully operational. This approach has served several of Argentina domestic and foreign policy purposes. First and foremost, it has supported its foreign policy of reinserting Argentine into the Western alliance as a reliable nation. It has also served as a symbol of pride to military personnel. And this policy’s main payoff is the improved domestic and international image of Argentina’s military establishment is having nowadays, both. In an address to students of the 1997 Latin American Strategic Study Course, the Argentine liaison officer to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), LTC Hernan Rizzo-Padron, said that the current trend indicates his country’s commitment to UN peacekeeping will continue and even increase as a key tool of its foreign policy.²³

In a similar speech, the liaison officer to CGSC from Brazil agreed with the Argentinean. He said that his country has the same position in this matter as Argentina. It is important to point

out, that the Brazilian government's policy is to deploy military units overseas only in a peacekeeping capacity, as opposed to peace enforcement or other kinds of forceful military engagement.²⁴ The Brazilian representative at CGSC, LTC Juarez de Paula Cuhna, states his government rejects the utilization its armed forces abroad in combat operations unless there is a declared war. Thereby, its commitment is only as peacekeepers. That is why, its overseas military presence obey to peacekeeping commitments as in UNEF 1 (conducted in Egypt-Israel, 1956-1967) where Brazil provided a battalion-size unit for more than 10 years. Also, two Brazilian Generals have commanded UNEF 1.

Colombia has also contributed to UNEF 1. It deployed battalion-size units for a year. Colombia also sent a signal battalion and a naval ship to Korea as part of the UN Multinational Forces. Likewise, in the Sinai Desert. Colombia and Uruguay had also engaged infantry battalion-size engineer and infantry units to support the multinational force and acted as third-party peace observers.

Panama and Peru also deployed battalions to UNEF II for a year, and Peruvian officers served as commanding officers of military observer units in the Golan Heights. Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina have had a long-term observer commitment in UNTSO in the Middle East and UNMOGGIP in India. Finally, Argentina participated during the Gulf War by sending two warships on blockade duty.

In terms of short-period observer missions as police trainers and several other UN Mandates, LA countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Barbados, Guyana, and Jamaica) have been actively involved. Troop contributors (as opposed to observer contributors) include Venezuela (with a battalion-size unit in ONUCA 1990); Argentine fast boats in the Gulf of Fonseca; Argentine and Uruguay infantry battalions in Croatia, Cambodia, and Mozambique; and a Chilean helicopter unit in UNIKOM.²⁵

It is also worthwhile to mention that during the Peru-Ecuador military confrontation in 1995, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, in conjunction with a US Special Operation Forces company (-), worked together to separate the warring armies in order to set the conditions for looking for peaceful solutions to resolve their border dispute.

Undoubtedly, the Uruguayan Military establishment is a predominant LA contributor to peacekeeping commitments. Uruguay prides itself on having the deep conviction of defending human rights, of self-determination, and of arriving at peaceful solutions to controversies. Its Army is prepared for war for the purposes of defending its sovereignty, while great materiel and human efforts are devoted to prosecute peace operations around the world.²⁶ As early as 1935, this small nation of about three million people has sent officers to help Bolivia and Paraguay to settle on arrangements for peace between the two countries. Immediately after the consolidation of the United Nations, Uruguay began deploying military observers to collaborate in the prevention of violence and to promote peaceful resolutions of international conflicts. It has since participated in Chaco Boreal-1935, India/Pakistan-1952, Sinai-1982, Honduras/Nicaragua-1988, Iran/Iraq-1988, Cambodia-1992, Mozambique-1993, Rwanda-1994, Tajikistan-1994, and Guatemala-1995. By virtue of this vast experience in peacekeeping operations, Uruguay is now regarded as one of the most authoritative in these matters.

In addition, Uruguay has also created a government entity, the National System to Support Peacekeeping Operations (SINOMAPA), which coordinates, plans, and advises its National Command Authority on peacekeeping issues. It also conducts training of personnel and units who will participate as observers, staff officers in multinational forces, and in multinational contingents. In spite of the limited quantity of its troops, many soldiers are selected and trained in operations other than war. In February 1997, Uruguay had seven percent of its Army engaged overseas in a peacekeeping capacity.²⁷

In summary, the current trend allows us to predict that in the foreseeable future Uruguay will continue its long-standing commitment to the international community in peace operations.

Venezuela's foreign policy includes the use of its armed forces in peacekeeping operations. Minister Counselor Ricardo Mario Rodriguez, Vice President of the Hemispheric Security Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS), pointed out in a telephone interview, that Venezuelan foreign policy highly favors the deployment of armed forces and civilian personnel in peacekeeping and humanitarian roles. In fact, Venezuela has sent officers as observers to El Salvador and participated in minesweeping and disarmament tasks in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and other Central American nations. Moreover, the Minister stated that in the past peacekeeping was not considered as a main priority in its national or foreign agenda. As a result, Venezuela has not participated as large a degree as it could have.²⁸ However, this policy is nowadays changing. A more active involvement in such engagements is foreseen.

In other telephone interview, with General Alvaro Barboza-Rodriguez, a Military Advisor at the UN Headquarters in New York City, he asserted that Venezuela is seeking a major role and greater participation in UN and/or OAS peacekeeping initiatives. The General mentioned that Venezuela is seriously analyzing the request for the deployment of a unit (company +) as part of a UN Stand-by Force. Additionally, Venezuela currently has significant amount of military observers serving in such UN locations as Kuwait, the Sahara Desert, Guatemala, and Bosnia.²⁹

In another telephone interview, in this occasion with Army General Manuel Delgado-Gainza, Venezuelan Mission Chief and General (NG) Orlando Hernandez V., Delegate, of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), informed the author that Venezuela is now expanding its participation in peacekeeping missions and has a robust presence in such forums. In the last two

years, the Venezuelan delegation has grown from one brigadier general to four and six full colonels, whose main task is to participate in a multinational planning cell. They also are supposed also to continuously assess and raise recommendations to the various commissions within the OAS about regional security and social issues. Certainly, it is a clear that this government is willing of bolster its peacekeeping commitment. As mention earlier, in February 1997 a small detachment of National Guardsmen were assigned to monitor and help with the minesweeping efforts in Guatemala, to show Venezuela's resolve to expand this policy.

One aspect upon which all those interviewed agreed was that Venezuela reserves the right to commit forces or resources abroad only when it serves its best national interests. It also the author's impression from personal and telephones interviews that Venezuela does not favor involvement in operations other than peacekeeping.

In the past few years, the Caribbean Island nations have also been intensively involved in multinational initiatives. Overcoming their force-structure limitations, these small countries joined together in an economic and security arrangement. Through this platform, the "Community of Caribbean States" has been able to influence policy, to some extent, in the region. One of its features is its rather frequent presence in multinational military and diplomatic coalitions. Indeed, these nations always appear in peacekeeping training and/or actual operations. For example, in 1995, the U.S. Atlantic Command and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic executed training exercises (namecoded "the Tradewinds") with some Caribbean Island nations. The purpose of this exercise was to promote readiness, disaster recovery activities, counterdrug operations, and small-units tactics.³⁰ They also engage in the annual (UNIDAS) training exercises.

In addition, Caribbean contingents and civilian police were also sent into Haiti and Central America. These troops have been deployed from such small states as Barbados, Belize,

Guyana, Jamaica, and so on. LTC Edward Collins (from Guyana), who served as a Caribbean contingent commander in 1995 in Haiti, said that together these nations assigned battalion-size units to performed duties as military police and peacekeepers during the Haiti intervention.³¹

However, as observed by Maj. George Lovell, a Belize representative at the 1997 CGSC Class, his nation did not commit forces at the beginning of the Haiti peace enforcement intervention because of its nature. As an organizational philosophy, the Community of Caribbean States is opposed to forceful peace operations except at the request of the host nation.

The OAS and its Peace Initiatives in the Americas

The Organization of American States (OAS) parallels the UN's role in the current world order. Its significance lies in striving for consensus in the Americas to foster regional peace, security, and mutual trust among the members of the Inter American System. Its influence began in 1947 with the Rio Treaty. This was the beginning of its long journey to impact the underlying causes of regional security conflicts and instability. In its attempt, however, this multinational entity has had reverses. In the 1980s, for instance, its conflict-resolutions mechanisms lost their ability to function effectively as a result of several adverse crises: the Falklands conflict of 1982, the Grenada invasion of 1983, the invasion of Panama in 1989, and the continuing Central America insurgency-based crises.³²

In the Dominican Republic case (1965-66), however, the OAS, through the Inter-American Military System (IAMS) masterminded and organized a full-fledged peacekeeping operation. Although, there was overwhelming US participation, the OAS must receive credit for the success of this operation because of its diplomatic and operative involvement.³³

There are many other instances of OAS success. On March 18, 1994, a meeting was held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in which participating hemisphere experts developed a series of

measures to create trust and mechanisms for regional security. This meeting took place in accordance with Resolution 1237 of the General Assembly.³⁴

On November 10, 1996, another hemisphere meeting occurred as a follow-on to the earlier meeting. Under the auspices of the OAS General Assembly, delegates produced a political document called the “Declaracion de Santiago Sobre Medidas de Fomento de la Confianza y de la Seguridad” (the Santiago Declaration over Measures for Development of Trust and Security).³⁵

This document reviews the “international world disorder” and its potential implications on the Americas as well as defining measures to facilitate the conditions to guarantee regional collective security, mutual trusts, and coordination and mutual support. It likewise emphasizes regional efforts (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to adopt measures for regional security, mutual trust, and to reduce the levels of poverty in the Americas, and protect of the natural environment. Other themes were respect of international law, the contribution to peacefully solve disputes, and the prohibition of the use of force among member nations.

A military prospective of the aforementioned documents was issued from the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), (the military body of the OAS). Among the military considerations that needed to be carried out to accomplish the hemispheric vision, are the need to reduce premature military engagements against each other, to foster close military coordination, to exchange intelligence, and to provide liaisons and observers to military training in areas fairly close to common borders and so on.³⁶

Since the 1970s the IADB has served as a thinking military and educational cluster in the search for global and regional security and social initiatives. Therefore, the IADB upholds a long-standing commitment in planning and promoting peacekeeping operations and training for LA military leaders and troops. Due to the significance of the subject matter, through Resolution

No. C-2878, 9 November 1995, the IADB Council established a permanent committee in charge of analyzing all issues related to peace operations in the Americas.³⁷ The first and foremost mission of the committee was to advise the Chief of Staff of the IADB and Council of Delegates about affairs concerning their strategic and political relationship with the OAS and peace operations to keep update the data base of OAS participation in peacekeeping operations and to establish follow-on academic relationships and exchange information with the IAMS as well as with political, economic, and cultural elements of power, both regional and worldwide.

The IADB engages, to a large extent, in several diplomatic and peacekeeping educational and training endeavors. For instance, it has been very actively involved either as organizer, participant, or observer in such events as the joint exercises called "Fuerzas Unidas-CENTAM 95," in November 1994; the seminar for "History of Peace Operations in the Americas" held in Puerto Rico, April 1995; the V Conference of Civil Affairs held in Guatemala, May 10, 1996; the combined exercises called "CENTAM 96" at SotoCano Air Base in Honduras, May 1996; and the "Fuerzas Unidas 96" in Montevideo, Uruguay, August 1996.³⁸ Moreover, in late 1996 the IADB participated as observer in the "Ejercicio CABANAS 97-PANAMA" held in Panama.

In short, through its new invigorated posture and initiatives the OAS is framing a credible influence in regional affairs, especially, by conveying the political will of the member nations of the American System. Important progress has been made in terms of regional security accords, peace operations, human rights, counter-drug efforts, and social development.

Has Peacekeeping been a Risk-Free Mission for Latin American Participants?

There is certainly not such a thing as risk-free peacekeeping missions. Despite their intent to perform peaceful tasks, peacekeepers have been targets of deadly and vicious attacks.

As mentioned earlier, several examples show that threats to peacekeepers (such as in hostage situations, laying mines, and getting caught between warring factions) remain very real.

Latin American peacekeepers have also had casualties. For instance, the Uruguayan Army had lost soldiers in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Rwanda. In Cambodia, in which Uruguay deployed an infantry battalion with 1,330, military and civilian police, three soldiers (two army, and one Marine) were killed.³⁹ Reportedly, four Argentinean soldiers have been killed in the last two years while serving as peacekeepers, and several others have undergone critical and minor wounds.⁴⁰ Consequently, policy-makers and military leaders should consider this issue when contemplating committing forces.

Lessons learned broadly illustrate that using experienced soldiers and emphasis in training and force security measures, could significantly reduce casualties and enhance possibilities for success in this complex environment.

Conclusions

Latin American nations and multinational organizations such as the OAS are becoming more aware than ever before of the necessity of being more involved in multinational initiatives oriented to solve regional security matters, to promote democracy, to expand peace operations, and to provide collective security. In fact, these organizations truly believe in the need for interdependency in order to address regional security and current social dilemmas. A great deal of regional and collective security arrangements have been agreed on as viable tools to minimize common contemporary ills (border disputes, counterguerrilla operations, narco-trafficking, hunger, social unrest, and so forth).

Heads of states attending solemn regional summits hailed a more in-depth cooperation for maintaining peace in the Inter-American System. They concur in urging endorsement and a

more active participation in UN/OAS peace initiatives, thus showing open willingness to deploy forces and resources to multinational endeavors both regionally and worldwide.

Peacekeeping has become the option of choice. The LAMS is very reluctant to intervene in peace enforcement operations or other types of overseas coalition warfare. Indeed, the organization's inclination is to allocate military and civilian contingents only to peacekeeping operations as opposed to peace enforcement and other kinds of forceful military intervention. There had been some exceptions, such as in the case of Argentina and Colombia. The latter sent a battalion-size unit to the UN war in Korea in 1950, and Argentine deployed a maritime unit to the Gulf War in 1992. However, the majority of nations currently favor multinational and consensual interventions.

Support to peacekeeping operations serves several parochial, as well as international, objectives. For some nations, it has served their foreign policy of reinsertion into the Western alliance as reliable nations. It has also constituted a symbol of pride to the military establishment. The exposure to complex operational environments with multinational forces facing nontraditional military tasks certainly positively impacts the evolution of these nations. These initiatives are also becoming a core duty in the new role for the military in the post-Cold War era. However, the most rewarding payoff of this policy may be the improving image of the military establishments both domestically and internationally.

Peace operations may also serve political objectives. Through these engagements governments send a message of friendship and good will to their regional neighbors and even worldwide. This could open gates to foreign political privileges and encourage favorable economic agreements.

Peacekeeping operations are not risk-free enterprises, however. Casualties can be expected. Latin American contingents and those from other nations have suffered losses. Such

operations are filled with uncertainties. The enemy is so complex that merely military responses are not enough to achieve success. In some instances, the enemy is the conflict itself. These nontraditional situations could be beyond the comprehension of many junior officers and unskilled young soldiers. Therefore, it is highly advisable to have special peacekeeping training and mature individuals for these deployments. Consequently, achieve national interests, LA policymakers and military leaders must be deeply committed before sending forces and resources into such situations.

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CHAPTER 5

VENEZUELA'S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO FUTURE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

This chapter is an overview of Venezuela's policy toward future peacekeeping operations. It emphasizes the current status of the Venezuelan military establishment in terms of organization, mission, and functions. Because it is intrinsically related to this study, special attention will be given to the mission, organization, and functions of the National Guard. The chapter will also examine Venezuela's earlier and most recent involvement in peacekeeping operations. Likewise, in light of some decisions made by the executive branch and the military leadership, which set a positive stage for peacekeeping operations, it is important to examine some authoritative opinions stemming from such agencies.

This chapter will start with an introduction to Venezuela. It is important to provide the flavor of Venezuela before its military and foreign policy. In terms of its physical environment, Venezuela is located in northeast South America. It is bounded on the north by the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean; on the east by Guyana; on the south by Brazil, and on the southwest and west by Colombia. Its coastline is about 2,735 kilometers (roughly 1,700 miles) long and has numerous indentations, of which the gulfs of Venezuela and Paria are especially notable. Of the approximately seventy islands off the coast that belong to it, Margarita Island is the largest and most important, both touristically and economically. Venezuela's geographical area encompasses 912,050 square kilometers (352,144 square miles). Its current population roughly reaches

twenty-plus millions. Spanish is its official language and Roman Catholicism is its official religion. The 1995 official estimate of adult literacy rate was 90 percent.

In the economic arena, at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, Venezuela's main export was coffee. Venezuela had been the world's third largest producer of coffee in the Nineteenth Century, after Brazil and Java (now Indonesia). By the end of President Juan Vicente Gomez's (mid-1930s) era, petroleum exploration and exploitation emerged, transforming the ends and means of a new Venezuela that looked toward industrialization. The significance of the Venezuelan oil industry suddenly rose, especially, with the nationalization of Mexican oil companies and the outbreak of the World War II. Indeed, Venezuela played a key role in planning and organizing the export of oil to other countries.

Inspired by Venezuela's success the Organization of Petroleum Export Countries (OPEC) was formally created in January 1961. The Venezuelan nationalization process ended in 1976. A characteristic of Venezuelan export polity was to gradually and carefully coordinate with the country's petroleum companies.

In the 1990s, the Venezuelan economy continues to be dominated by the oil industry. Despite efforts to diversify the country's source of income, including the expansion of steel and aluminum production, petroleum remains the major source of government revenue and export earning. Great governmental endeavors, however, have been undertaken to improve the manufacture sector. Starting in the 1970s, the government gave high priority to developing this area of the economy. From the 1980s to today, localities such as Ciudad Guayana and Valencia produce large quantities of oil, steel, fertilizers, cement, tires, vehicles, processed food, clothing, and wood products. Therefore, Venezuela is progressively modernizing and improving its manufacture infrastructure to the extent that manufacturing is considered the second major source of income.

Looking at its history, before Venezuela's discovery in the Sixteenth Century, the country was inhabited by a number of indigenous (Amerindians), among which the most substantially were the Caribs and Arawaks. The revolution for independence from Spanish rule began in the early Nineteenth Century and ended by July 5, 1811 when its Independence Proclamation was formally signed. However, total liberation was not fully accomplished until June 21, 1821, when the "Carabobo Battle" took place. It was led by "the greatest man of America," as contemporarily known, General Simon Bolivar. This great Venezuelan also led the successful struggles of other nations trying to expel the Spanish Monarchy from Latin American soil. Indeed, Simon Bolivar, along with other valiant national heroes, liberated Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.

Bolivar's dream was to unify Latin America as one big nation. However, unification was not possible to achieve in his lifetime. In 1830 the Great Colombia (composed of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama) disintegrated. However, Bolivar's legacy and dreams for freedom and democracy are still deeply rooted in the minds and strength of Venezuela, especially, within its armed forces.

War, revolutions, and counterrevolutions characterized Venezuela's early years in spite of its independence. However, this nation has always strongly honored peaceful means, not violence, in setting external disputes. In 1886 a border disagreement occurred with British Guiana (now Guyana). Far from imposing itself militarily over the disputed territory, Venezuela sought international mediation or arbitration to solve the conflict. The US persuaded Great Britain to submit the case to arbitration. Subsequently the arbiters awarded the larger share to Great Britain.

Diplomatically, as opposed to militarily, Venezuela has firmly defended its territory when disagreements with neighbors have arisen. Venezuela has never committed aggression or threatened with military interventions bordering countries or other nations.

The Military Establishment

Venezuela's military leadership is vested in the person of the President who is the Commandant-in-Chief. The command and control of the armed forces is exercised by the Minister of Defense. The president is also assisted in defense matters by the Supreme Council of National Defense (CONASEDE), which consists of the Council of Ministers, the Chairman of Joint Chief Staffs, and individual service commanders.

The Venezuelan military establishment is composed of the Minister of Defense (a general officer), the Inspector General, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and four separate services: Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Guard. It also has an ad hoc council (the Junta Superior) that meets weekly to analyze national security matters and to conduct arraignments of personnel charged with serious offenses.

The National Constitution states that the Armed Forces constitute an institution that is apolitical, obedient, and not deliberative; organized by the state to ensure the national defense, the stability of democratic institutions, the respect for the constitution, and laws; and the compliance with the national authorities, which will always take precedence over any other obligation.¹

The Venezuelan Armed Forces are professional and well-equipped. There are approximately 90,000 military personnel on active duty (officers, NCOs, and conscripts). In principle, there was a draft system in the near-past that required all Venezuelan males 18 years of age to serve for two years and then remain in the reserve until the age of 45. In practice,

however, many males, including skilled workers in essential occupations, university students, and head of households, were exempted from service. Lately, the system has shifted to a voluntary conscription, and the government pays soldiers a minimum-wage monthly salary. Many other features remain the same.

As in other nations, each military branch of service has its unique and particular roles and missions to contribute to achieve overall national objectives. Article 12 of the Organic Law of the National Armed Forces clearly defines the traditional roles of each branch. Essentially, duties include protecting national citizens and interests and guaranteeing territorial sovereignty and political stability. The Army, Navy, and Air Force execute similar duties and responsibilities as assigned everywhere in the world. It is interesting to note that Venezuelan pioneer leaders envisioned the creation of an additional force, the National Guard, that would perform special duties during peacetime as well as in wartime.

The National Guard of Venezuela: Mission Organization and Functions

Even though it has been operating since General Simon Bolivar's times in the Nineteenth Century, the National Guard was officially created on 4 August 1937 by General Eleazar Lopez Contreras, by then the Venezuelan president. A former commanding general of the National Guard, General Julio Cesar Pena-Sanchez, wrote that the original idea for the force was conceived by the "Liberator," Simon Bolivar, during the struggle for independence.² Indeed, the idea of having a National Guard was considered repeatedly by various heads of the state before its foundation by President Lopez Contreras.

The National Guard was meant to share the responsibilities for national defense with its sister services, and it was also to conduct law enforcement operations. In other words, it would not only act as a professional infantry element during wartime, in which its main mission would

be the security of communications zone, lines of communications, and enemy prisoners of wars, but also to ensure internal security during peacetime (for example, performing counterdrug and counterinsurgency operations,, maintaining public order, protecting natural resources, and so forth). Essentially, the scope of the VNG would be to address the respect and enforcement of laws against all manner of illegal activities.

The dynamic elements involved the transition from a rural Venezuela to an industrialized nation made the National Guard an multi-faceted military force with a spectrum of missions that go beyond traditional military roles and duties, and enhance its standing as a prominent organization in contemporary Venezuelan society. In fact, the grave social political situation that occurred at the time of the death of the dictator, General Juan Vicente Gomez, in 1935, fostered an outbreak of serious public disturbances with which existing institutions unable to cope. The government felt itself also incompetent to effectively provide safe and secure living conditions and protection for its borders, roads, ports, countryside, immigration laws, internal security, and others services. At that time, it was believed that those functions could only be executed by forces especially trained for such missions. President Lopez Contreras then created the National Guard, established as permanent military institution meant to be composed of infantry units and technical and professional individuals with the mission of becoming a “powerful auxiliary of the civil authorities in the maintenance of social tranquillity”.³

The National Guard (NG) is a military governmental entity separate from the Army and from the traditional police forces. Yet, just as the country has evolved, so has the National Guard. It has adapted its organization, mission training, equipment, and strength to meet new realities and threats. For instance, one NG mission, among others, is to strengthen the necessary vigilance to maintain public order, especially, to intervene in disrupting riots with which local

Special Administrative Police. The National Guard also ensures compliance with laws related to:

1. National Revenue Collection Service. The NG actively participates in collecting taxes from individuals as well as businesses. It serves as an armed entity of the government to impose sanctions and to initiate judicial process against tax evasion. Guardsmen also guarantee the safety of custom services installations and monitor and enforce the collection of customs taxes.

2. The protection of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources Service. The Guard's tasks include controlling wildfires, monitoring the contamination of rivers and exploitation of forestry and miner products, and protecting Venezuela's fauna and flora.

3. The Physical Security of Installations Service. The objective of this service is to protect the installations of important and strategic industries regarded as vital to the nation's economy, security, and defense. Included are oil and petrochemical facilities, mining installations, and other public and private installations.

4. The Public Traffic Service. The Guard guarantees compliance with traffic laws on main national highways and interstate roads.

5. The External Security of Correctional Centers: Supervises and ensures external security of penal facilities and custody of inmates while being transported to court, hospitals, or elsewhere.

6. The Border Patrol Service. The Guard exercises control of border areas and contribute to their economic and social development, not only through military presence, but also through civic-military operations.

7. The Counter-Drug Service. The Guard represses all activities related to drug production, trafficking, storage, processing, and illegal consumption.

authorities could no longer contend. But it also has the mission of repressing smuggling and controlling arms and drug trafficking.

The special organic law that governs the Venezuelan Armed Forces gives the services, including the NG, the following general objectives:⁴

1. Ensure the national defense and comply with the constitution and democratic institutions.
2. Cooperate in the maintenance of public order.
3. Participate in the overall development of the country.
4. Carry out military and other tasks specified in laws and regulations.

Despite the above set of traditional military missions, the Armed Forces of Cooperation (as the National Guard is officially named), must undertake measures to enforce laws and actions to ensure compliance with internal security, revenue regulations, protection of natural resources, protection of basic and strategic installations and support of the judiciary system. To achieve these endeavors, there is set of specific missions and unique resources which with to operate.

Law Enforcement Functions

General Administrative Police. Maintain public order in rural areas, in isolated zones in which other security organizations are not established, and in urban areas to collaborate in technical operations of policing geared to bolster peace and tranquillity, especially, when local police forces cannot adequately confront problems at hand. Across a wide spectrum, the NG performs security operations that encompass border patrol, drug interdiction, counterguerrilla operations, reestablishment of public order, response to natural disasters, providing security for basic and strategic national industries, and so on. Guardsmen also receive training in public relations, public order, combat in urban terrain settings and control.

Judicial Police. Carry out the intrinsic functions framed in the Guard's role as a "principal judicial police organization." These functions are executed through close cooperation with the court system. The National Guard has a top-of-the-line criminal laboratory, whose mission is to provide technical support in terms of analysis of objects and providing forensic evidence to trial courts. The NG also serves as an auxiliary of the courts by participating in the gathering of evidence and securing defendants in criminal cases, safeguarding objects related to crimes, providing security to judges while executing judicial orders, transporting defendants who must give their depositions in court, and other related matters.

Organization and Operational Deployment

The macrostructure of the National Guard is as follow:

1. The Commanding General, under which are the--

- a. Inspector General
- b. Chief of General Staff
- c. Personnel Command
- d. Operational Command
- e. Logistic Command
- f. Schools Command.

2. Operational Deployment under which are--

- a. Regional commands (major combat units of brigade-size)
- b. Rural command detachments (of battalion size)
- c. Support units
- d. Coastal guard command

e. Special operational units, including the special operations group, and special security and public order units, which include urban security commands.

The educational system teaches all of the military and law enforcement subjects a soldier needs in order to be a professional and skillful as well as being but also a guarantor of law and order. Besides basic soldier skills and infantrymen drills, Guardsmen are trained during 18 months to meet qualifications in general and special administrative police functions. This intense training demands that Guardsmen master a dual military and police mind-set. On the military side, students become familiar with basic-soldier training, which includes; navigation exercises, jungle warfare, confined warfare, first aid, tactical and administrative marches (day/night), physical training, weapons awareness, target shooting (with individual and crew-served arms), chemical warfare, and so forth. Then, the training goes to more specific areas such as: escort of convoys, conduction of checkpoints, handling explosives, etc.

Career professional development patterns for each category of personnel (commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel) determine general educational programs.

Training strategies and policies are periodically updated to respond to scientific and technological advances and the changing needs of the institution and the nation. Ninety percent of officers receive their commission from the National Guard Military Academy (EFOFAC). Other professionals, according to institutional needs, can be incorporated without passing through the academy, by participating in a short military training. Warrant officers also attend a NG military academy (ESCUSERFAC), going through the academies of sister services, and by attending the nursing military academy.

Like the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the National Guard receives a quota of young Venezuelans selected to serve their (18 month) voluntary military service. These citizens report to the NG National Conscript Training Center, whose mission is provide basic soldier skills and

ethical and moral values. Then, soldiers are sent to combat and administrative units to perform military duties until ending their set service time. When those conscripts have finished their obligation and after satisfying educational requirements, they have the option of joining the professional members of the force, either as Guardsmen, as non-commissioned officers (NCOs), or as commissioned officers.

On August 4, 1996, the current Commanding General, Euro Luis, Rincon-Viloria, addressing the audience attending the formal ceremony on the occasion of the fifty-ninth anniversary of the National Guard, reaffirmed the military nature of the force while acknowledging its intimate linkage with the enforcement of laws and pursuit of peace and national contentment. “We are the soldiers of law.”⁵ As his strategic-development vision for the NG while in office, General Rincon-Viloria asserted his desire to consolidate the police role, reinforce its realm of employment in wartime, and the pursue the enrichment and extent of technology to meet the challenges of the twenty-first Century. Referring to the President Gomez era, he added that the National Guard was in the past, and even more now, an effective government response to a national security challenge stemming from the breakout of political and social disorder. Finally, while General Rincon did not specifically mentioned his position regarding using the force overseas in peacekeeping operations, he was the first commandant to deploy troops in such capacity (a small detachment of Guardsmen was sent to perform de-mining tasks and as military observers to Guatemala after the peace agreement just recently signed.)

Venezuelan Foreign Policy and the Employment of the Armed Forces

Even though Venezuela does not have an official document like the US National Security Strategy, it defines its overall national objectives and strategies in a document called “El Noveno Plan de la Nacion.”⁶ This plan is the government’s master plan from which each

cabinet member derives his long-range, and short-range objectives. Even though this is not a National Military Strategy-like document per se, it provides policy in the arena, and it is written and disseminated through directives and resolutions. By reviewing speeches and official positions in domestic and international forums, one may identify Venezuela's viewpoint in the employment of its military forces is a matter of foreign policy.

Venezuela's foreign policy includes the use of its armed forces in peace operations. Since Venezuela is a signatory country to the UN, it may be requested to perform duties in a given UN commitment. Therefore, Venezuela's military forces, if required by the UN and in the national interest, must be ready and capable of conducting operations in extraterritorial theaters. In a telephone interview, the Venezuelan Minister Counselor Ricardo Mario Rodriguez, Vice President of the Hemisphere Security Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS), pointed out that Venezuelan foreign policy highly favors the deployment of Venezuelan military forces and civilian personnel in peacekeeping and humanitarian roles.⁷

In fact, Venezuela has sent officers as observers in the pacification process of Central America. For instance, it has participated in the minesweeping and disarmament tasks in Nicaragua. Venezuela has also lately assigned observers and monitors to other peace operations sites, such as the Sahara Desert, Kuwait, Bosnia, and so on. Rodriguez stated, however, that since peacekeeping operations have not been a main priority in the military agenda in the past, Venezuela has not participated worldwide in a much larger fashion.⁸

In the official report of the II Conference of Ministers of Defense of The Americas, held in Argentine from 6-9 October 1996, the Venezuelan delegation, composed of the current Minister of Defense (Army MG Nicolas Valencia-Vivas), the Vice-Foreign Secretary (Milos Alcalay), and other high-level officials, Venezuela endorsed and recognized the significant value of UN peace operations as the more feasible avenue in which to contribute to solve international

conflicts. However, the delegation cautioned that such Venezuelan actions must be done with respect to international public laws and mutual consent. Furthermore, Venezuela concurred with other delegations in that there must also be a clearly defined scenario or mandate to avoid repeating the errors that occurred in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Angola. In addition, it was stipulated that the military component needs a sound educational and training foundation to participate in these operations.⁹

In another telephone interview, on this occasion with Army General, Manuel Delgado Gainza, and General (NG) Orlando V. Hernandez Venezuelan Chief and Delegate, respectively, informed the Inter-American Defense Board, that Venezuela was now expanding its participation in peacekeeping missions and that it has a robust presence in such forum (increasing from one general to three generals and four full colonels). This is a clear indication of a reinforcement of Venezuela's commitment. In addition General Hernandez described the excellent results attained by the VNG mission (a small detachment) that was just assigned to monitor and conduct minesweeping in Guatemala.

A disconnection between the UN and allied nations in their military and political framework, along with poor preparedness, could inhibit success in future peacekeeping missions. Participating nations, especially newcomers, should observe a well-organized and disseminated body of procedures and understandings in this matter. Consequently, ensuring success for the Venezuelan Armed Forces' contribution, even if small, poses a significant challenge to its military establishment. Undoubtedly, therefore, the UN would have to consider doctrine, training, and equipment when matching missions with Venezuela's capabilities.

General Alvaro Barboza-Rodriguez, was the first Venezuelan battalion commander, along with his entire unit, to be given a UN peacekeeping mission. In response to the survey mailed to his office in the UN Headquarters in New York City by the author, the General

candidly rendered a quite extensive memorandum expressing his viewpoints about peace operations and the Venezuelan Armed Forces. As military advisor to the Venezuelan mission before the UN, General Barboza-Rodriguez, asserted that his country endorses military participation in peace operations but only under UN auspices. To such extent, Venezuela presently has military observers in UNIKOM (Kuwait), MINURSO (Sahara Desert), and MINIGUA (Guatemala). In the past, Venezuela has also participated in deployments to ONUCA, ONUSAL, and UNPROFOR. And in 1990, it deployed a "special infantry security unit (of 700 men) of which he had the honor to be the commanding officer."¹⁰ This Special Security Unit's mission was to ensure the disarmament of the Nicaragua Resistance. General Barboza-Rodriguez continued that as policy, Venezuela would participate in such operations when they were of meaningful geopolitical or strategic interest for Venezuela.

The UN has proposed a new concept by which it would have a reserve unit under its operational control. The UN has invited the international community to participate in it. The UN hails a thesis of "early deployment." Such a force would consist of a heavy Quick Reaction Brigade that could be quickly transported in a hot spot anywhere in the world, to keep crises from growing worst or spreading out. This UN request has had echos in Venezuela; politicians and military planners are currently seriously analyzing the UN proposal. In addition, Venezuela is participating in some workshops and training conducted by the UN that will address the formation of the stand-by UN force.

There has been a quite rapid exchange of letters between the Venezuelan JCS and the UN regarding Venezuela's incorporation into the UN's stand-by force. In October 1996, the military advisor of the Venezuelan UN mission received an official request from the JCS asking for recommendations as to the exact requirements for what the Venezuelan unit was to look like, other logistic issues, and so on.¹¹ Responding to the request for information through a

document identified as Fax No. MPV 074, signed on 28 October 1996, the UN military advisor projected a self-sufficient enhanced infantry company with medical service support, air support, CSS, engineer elements, civil police, civilian experts, and some technicians.

The Venezuelan military establishment has not yet developed a sound doctrine in these matters. Basically, it follows UN terms of reference and applies them case by case. Regarding training for future peacekeeping engagements, after the experience gained in Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador, it was recommended to the Army to prepare and keep ready an infantry company (plus) that would be able to react rapidly, if needed. This criteria gained more ground under the "stand-by" force concept held by the UN.

While gearing up for operations in Nicaragua, General Barboza said that because of a lack of doctrine, he decided to start training according to an Army directive that emphasized infantry-soldier training. His criteria was that "an excellent soldier, well-trained and disciplined, would be an excellent executor of peace operations, and given the complexity of such duties, a soldier should be ready to effectively confront any unexpected situation." The unit chosen to perform the mission was a parachute battalion, which later was enhanced with combat support and combat service support elements to increase its robustness as an infantry unit. General Barboza finally stated, that the results in this case were excellent, although if Venezuela were to install a stand-by unit, he would personally recommend, as necessary, additional training regarding the physical environment in which the unit would operated, UN mandates, the mission, interfacing with the local populace, and so on.

In addition to the aforementioned peacekeeping missions in which Venezuela had participated, it is worthwhile to mention that on 28 March 1988 Venezuela responded accordingly to a UN request for a unit to be deployed into Namibia to help that African country in its struggle for independence and democracy. A directive from the Minister of Defense was

issued ordering the activation of a contingent formed by the 42d “Colonel Antonio Nicolas Briceno” Parachute Battalion and move it to the area of operations under the orders of the UN TF commander in Namibia. Laborious detailed planning and hasty training and enhancement of the unit was conducted and supervised by Army Colonel Henry Ortega-Mota.¹² The unit had many vacancies and lacked certain logistic support at the time it was called. Thus, officers, NCOs, and soldiers had to be drawn from other units. Also, because of a lack of training as paratroopers, newcomers underwent a hasty update in that skill.

The Namibian TF commander gave the 42d Parachute Battalion the mission of being the reserve force. The force had only seven days in which to prepare for deployment to Africa. However, the TF commander did not consider it imperative that the Venezuelan unit be deployed to the area of operation whatsoever. Once the mission was accomplished the unit dissolved.

Key Issues in the Process of Getting Ready for Nicaragua’s PK Mission

In February 1990, the Special Security Unit “Venezuela,” an enhanced battalion-size unit, received orders to be ready for Nicaragua. The specified mission was to supervise and help in the voluntary demobilization process and disarmament of the “Resistencia Nicaraguense,” and to help create acceptable conditions and confidence building in the area in order to allow displaced and former guerrillas to safely return to the cities.¹³ On 10 April 1990, after speedy training, the unit flew into Toncontin (Honduras). The list of tasks to perform included handling and safeguarding arms and military materiel turned in by belligerents, destruction of individual and collective weapons, escorting convoys, providing local security, patrolling, supervising compliance with truce agreements, and avoiding violations against rebels or government officials in the neutral zone.

Under the on-site supervision of Spanish Major General Agustin Quesada-Gomez ONUCA JTFC, and the supervision of the Venezuelan Battalion, the demobilization process started in Mocoron (Honduras). The Miskitos Front's rebels (an indigenous tribe) were the first to peacefully turn in their weapons. Later, other guerrillas (such as the Yamales) gave up their weapons and other military materiel. Over 15,300 rifles and pistols, 137 mortars, 146 mines, 1,333 hand grenades were collected and 22,373 guerrillas demobilized. In this process there was a lot of interfacing with NGOs and PVOs (such as CIAV, OPS, OMS, and so on). Interestingly, at the disarming and demobilizing sites, after combatants turned in all of their military equipment and clothing, the peacekeepers guided and even helped the guerrillas to choose sizes and civilian clothing that international organizations had provided for them.

With its organic resources, the Venezuelan battalion also provided medical, religious, legal, and psychological services to their men as well as to locals. There was also an occasion in which ONUCA commanders (including the Venezuelan battalion commander) were invited to a meeting with Nicaraguan President Violeta de Chamorro and Commandant of the Army Daniel Ortega.

General Barboza-Rodriguez assessed the mission as being successful and without any major blocking issues. However, he recognized that there were some awkward situations because of language barriers. Spanish-speaking contingents used their language to function in the AO and had showed no problems in adapting to the terrain. Their European counterparts, however, spoke UN military English (the official UN language), which on certain occasions caused misunderstanding and frustration. The physical environment to some extent was also an issue in this regard. In closing, giving his opinion as to whether professional soldiers were more suitable than conscripts for deployment in peacekeeping operations, he held that professional

soldiers would generally be more appropriate. Of course, professional soldiers would have had better training, be more mature, and have a better understanding of such missions.

In summary, Venezuela endorses and practices the overseas employment of military units and observers, but only under a UN and/or OAS auspices for performing peacekeeping operations as opposed to peace enforcement or other form of forceful military intervention. Additionally, it seems clear that this trend will be the pattern for Venezuela's near future foreign policy.

Indeed, the Venezuelan Armed Forces constitutes a well trained, disciplined, and equipped military establishment quite capable and competent to successfully carry out this kinds of commitments. In its periodic participation with military observers and with units, these forces seems to have grasped the essence of what is needed to be done in a peacekeeping environment in order to reduce tensions and promote understanding.

As we have seen, in today's evolving nature of peacekeeping, forces featuring military and law enforcement capabilities are deemed more suitable for employment in such missions. Not only combat power (teeth) but also heart (compassion) are assets supposed to adorn a peacekeeping intervening force. Situations similar to the ones that occurred in Somalia, Zaire, Rwanda, Central America, and Haiti depict what is meant by "teeth and heart." Therefore, it is believed that if Venezuela is called upon, once again, it certainly should include a National Guard Detachment in order to create a more robust, responsive, credible, and effective force. Their own organization, missions, and functions ensure Guardsmen would provide an excellent contribution to peacekeeping missions.

In matters of internal security tasks, and interacting with local populations as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private volunteers organizations (PVOs), undoubtedly, the Venezuelan National Guard units are the most capable of meeting the mission's

expectations. As it usually does, the National Guard becomes the bridge between the military establishment and the law enforcement agencies in situations of maintaining public order and internal security. When the police are overrun or is unable to handle public disturbances, the force to call is the National Guard. Although its military status organizationally attached to the Ministry of Defense, the National Guard, closely works with the interior minister and state governors oversee public order matters, as well as other common threats. Therefore, its capabilities "teeth and compassion" make the Venezuelan National Guard the alternative of choices to be employed in peacebuilding functions and peacekeeping tasks.

Looking at the case of Haiti, for instance, it was clear that intervening forces (arriving on site 10 to 20 days after the multinational entry force) with characteristics similar to the ones distinguishing the VNG, would be more than adequate to achieve the operational and strategic JTF objectives. Most of the operations in Haiti involve maintaining public order, restoring respect for law and security, policing cities, disarming local clans, and so forth. To respond to social and political disarray is a task integral to the historical nature of the VNG. Thus, acting in Haiti would have been "business as usual" for Guardsmen. We can make the same argument with the problems affecting Central America, Bosnia, and even Somalia.

In peacekeeping operations National Guard-like forces are paramount to achieve success. Having all of the necessary light infantry weaponry and equipment, plus additional UN-like peacekeeping operations training, the VNG would be the best resort.

Although, it seems not to be a Venezuelan policy to participate in peace enforcement ventures, note that Guardsmen are also be able to do a reliable job as a follow-on force to reestablish law and order, and to help run public services and act as liaison between local authorities and force commanders.

¹Constitution of the Republic of Venezuela, Article 8, 1961.

²Julio C Pena Sanchez, The Venezuelan National Guard, Ministry of Defense Press, Fort Tiuna, Caracas, Venezuela, 1995, 3.

³Ibid., 5.

⁴Ibid., 7.

⁵"Discurso en el Acto Central Conmemorativo del 59 Aniversario de la Guardia Nacional de Venezuela," Hacia Una Especificidad Institucional, National Guard Press, Caracas, Venezuela, 1996, 26.

⁶ Republica de Venezuela, Ministerio de Coordinacion y Planificacion, Noveno Plan de la Nacion, 1994.

⁷Ricardo M. Rodriguez, Ph.D., Minister Counselor and Vice-President of Hemisphere Security Commission, OAS, Telephone Interview.

⁸Ibid.

⁹United Nations, Informe sobre la II Conferencia de Ministros de la Defensa de las Americas. San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina, October 6-9, 1996, 3.

¹⁰Barboza, R. Alvaro, Venezuela and the UN peacekeeping Operations, No MPV-34, New York, N.Y., February 1997.

¹¹Barboza, R. Alvaro, United Nations Stand-By Arrangements. Status Report as of 01 October 1996, United Nations, New York, N.Y., 1996.

¹²Ejercito Venezolano; Ayer Exportamos Libertad Hoy Exportamos Paz. ARS Publicidad, Caracas, Venezuela, 1996, 3.

¹³Ibid., 6.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

As stated in the introduction and demonstrated throughout this study, the unprecedented and uncertain upheaval spreading all over the world will demand peacekeeping engagements well into the twenty-first century. Interdependency and collective security constitute the pledged, current, and foreseeable policy the international system likely will hail for some time to come. Findings in this study extensively demonstrate that peacekeeping is and will be an omnipresent and dynamic international tool to be frequently used to promote peace and help in humanitarian relief efforts. Therefore, peacekeeping is no longer just an emergency course of action for the international community. It has become, rather, an almost routine activity that quite often deals with emergencies.

Glancing at what some call the “new world order,” the demise of the Soviet Union resulted in the loosening of the bonds of restraint in the international system. This fact, coupled with increased terrorism, narco-trafficking, famine, ethnic conflicts, social and political disparity, reinitialized hatreds, border disputes, natural disasters, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), new and old diseases, and the appearance of new players (national, transnational, and sub-state actors), makes international cooperation a necessity to assure that the means of credibly confronting today’s unrest are suitable.

In light of what was found in this analytical study, these findings agree with the observation of Samuel Huntington in his article, “The Clash of Civilizations,” in which he states

that the increase of new forces and players, framing the makeup of the new world order, will encourage interdependency among nations, especially in the international security environment. In fact, societal clashes--new and old maladies--are becoming more cruel and more intense. The new republic of Albania illustrates how quickly a nation can become an unruly and anarchical state. As this is written, rebels have seized cities and openly steal goods from market places; even police forces have been seen vandalizing stores. The government seems incapable of controlling the rebels, either by using coercion or by exerting political control. In a televised press conference, the new Prime Minister requested the help of NATO and the US. It remains to be seen what the aftermath of this situation will be.

Similarly, profound social injustices and political imbalance and famine continue to be constant players in the international arena. Meanwhile, the spread of WMD and technologies hold dangers that only can be imagined.

The extreme scarcity of food resulting from the aftereffects of domestic or international wars, extreme poverty, natural or manmade disasters, and critical social imbalances seems likely to continue promoting violence and suffering around the world. This fact was more than evident in the case studies we thoroughly reviewed (such as, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Kurdish situation, Bosnia, Central America, Cambodia, and more recently, Zaire).

As this study ascertains, the reemergence of and increase in terrorist acts is causing tremendous instability and preoccupation in the international community. Terrorism is becoming more than ever an effective, relatively inexpensive, and pervasive means of getting a message across. Terrorist acts are referred to only superficially but the list continues to increase: the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City; the New York Trade Center; the American Compound in Saudi Arabia; the poisoning of a subway station in Tokyo; the bombing at the Olympics in Atlanta; the constant bombing of Colombia's oil pipelines; and the seizure of the

Japanese Embassy in Peru by the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement and others. Therefore, it is judged that security challenges like terrorism, drug smuggling, guerrilla movements, ethnic conflicts, religion-based hatred, refugees, territorial disputes, social and political imbalances, and proliferation of WMD, will dictate the present and future international agenda.

Another major driving force dictating foreign policy is the spread of global television. "The CNN factor," picturing deaths and human suffering, has actually increased the impact on public opinion, which in turn demands governmental and international actions to address televised calamities. Conversely, conflicts or tragedies that do not capture the attention or interest of the media become diplomatically invisible.

What is the policy toward peacekeeping? As argued by Canadian Major General Romeo Dallier, a former UN Force Commander in Rwanda, "like it or not" peacekeeping is becoming a core activity to be performed by US and other leading nations of the Western Hemisphere. The international community is compelled to act on the face of horrendous manmade atrocities, such in Rwanda. Similarly, Russian leaders consider it to be immoral to stay inert and do nothing to restore peace and stability, especially in near-abroad nations. Indeed, its military leadership concurs that they will broaden cooperation in this arena with UN, CSCE, and NATO. Interestingly enough, one special feature in the Russian approach is that they believe and, more likely than not, will practice the imposition of peace rather than waiting until being requested to intervene.

By the same token, and spelled out in its National Security Strategy, the US holds as core strategic national objectives the need to: (1) to enhance security, (2) to promote prosperity, and (3) to promote democracy. These three major objectives undoubtedly account for this nation's commitment in places such as Haiti, Somalia, Zaire, Bosnia, Macedonia, and so on. Although, the deployment of US forces in such capacity is heavily regulated, the Clinton

administration has consistently stated that its in the US national interest to promote stability and to stop human suffering, and that US forces will be used to promote such goals when vital US interests are at stake.

Other NATO states, which have been traditional peacekeepers, have expressed their interest to continue to participate in PK missions. The Latin American approach toward peacekeeping coincides with the view of many other nations enhancing their engagements in peace operations. Argentina has already opened a peacekeeping center for training UN PKO providers. For many years, the military apparatus of Uruguay, Brazil, even Colombia, has committed forces abroad to contribute to worldwide peace initiatives. As part of the Latin American Military System, Venezuela has also participated in a variety of peace operations, and several indicators suggest that this trend will continue to be part of its foreign policy.

The political will shown by the above nations coupled with the view of a wide variety of military establishments surveyed for this study, suggest that peacekeeping missions and requirements for the twenty-first Century will be tremendous. Insofar as survey question No. 16, "What do you think will be the extent of requirements for peacekeeping operations for the near and long-term future?" the answers were really open-ended. Nonetheless, they expressed a similarity of thought:

1. Peacekeeping requirements in the near future will be broader.
2. Peacekeeping will be multinational in nature.
3. Refugees will continue being an issue demanding peacekeeping operations.
4. Peace enforcement will be even more in demand than will peacekeeping operations, albeit it will require peacekeeping forces for follow-on efforts.
5. Peacekeeping requirements will not remain the same; they will be more complex, and thus less easy to address.

Certainly, peace operations have become the big stick of the international community and international organizations. They are deemed viable means of minimizing the turmoil created by emerging nations. Peacekeeping, being a major tool of these peace operations, has lately been greatly utilized. Because of the complexity of these new driving forces, the traditional nature of peacekeeping has radically evolved. And yet, this continuous transformation process urges practitioners, as well as international organizations, to regularly review methods, techniques, and procedures to ensure more effective and efficient accomplishment of their goals. There is no standard peacekeeping mission. Each operation is conducted in a unique setting with its own political, geographic, economic, and military characteristics.

Although peacekeeping is not combat, it actually entails a high degree of danger; it is even deadly at times. This rather unfortunate reality presents leaders and soldiers with a difficult situation; they can only use armed restraint and minimum force to accomplish the mission. Therefore, leaders and soldiers need to be prepared and have the maturity to adjust their mindset from combat to peacekeeping. The fundamental lesson is that required skills for serving in future Somalias, Bosnias, and Haitis should not be learned “on the job.” Doing so would not only be awkward, it would also be deadly.

Once again, the complexity of the “new world disorder” persistently challenges leaders of international organizations and leading “third-wave nations.” This security environment demands more complex peacekeeping interventions. As a result, military leaders must react according to this new reality and be prepared to mentally and physically confront these uncertainties. This is when thoughtful, effective training becomes necessary.

For instance, the intricacy of performing peacekeeping may be better comprehended by reviewing some answers in the survey used in this study. Regarding question No. 11, “Identify

the causes of tension and difficulty in conducting missions associated with societal issues," some ninety percent concurred with the premise that "language" was a great thwarting factor or, at least, slowed down normal activities at peacekeeping sites. It causes difficulties in dealing with natives; it imposes the need for interpreters when fulfilling law-enforcement tasks; and it hinders interfacing at low echelons (between soldiers and NCOs), especially when they must transmit new directions or regulations to locals.

"Culture, religion, and racism" were also regarded as success stoppers. Officers and troops assigned to the Middle East realized (on site) their lack of knowledge about Islamic culture and religious beliefs. Survey respondents stated that on many occasions they were shocked by the behavior of these people and their laws and social rules. Finally, African troops deployed in former Yugoslavia observed that "race," was a hampering factor in performing peace operations. Their presence was not seen amicably by local Eastern Europeans. When they first arrived, their skin color caused dissension among the local populace and complicated negotiations with warring factions. Coping with this "problem," and thus attaining conditions where the soldiers could perform, commanding officers of these troops had to be patient, mature, and restrained, and ignore verbal aggression. They had to show neutrality and be friendly. The bottom line is that "cultural environment and religion awareness" have to be taken into consideration and be part of the subjects taught during UN training before deployment.

Although, there will never be doctrinal leverage to solve such deeply rooted differences, training and awareness on the part of senior and junior leadership as well as soldiers should be emphasized, in order to at least meet the requirements they will face with a certain degree of success. Besides this kind of training, survey respondents consistently agree that leader and staff training; force deployment; intelligence collection and use, especially at the tactical level;

discipline of fire; mine awareness; operation of checkpoints; military police functions; and control of public disturbances are vital.

It is not necessary to neglect warfighting training for peacekeeping. In fact, the two intertwine perfectly. Nevertheless, military leaders and policy makers must understand that the unique environment of engagement demands additional training and resources to achieve success. We need to understand that peacekeeping is a dangerous and stressful duty that requires highly disciplined as well as educated soldiers who understand the nature of peacekeeping operations. As shown, each unit assigned to peacekeeping must be flexible enough to fight and win, even if in self-defense. US LTC John Abizaid, who participated as a battalion commander in the operation "Restore Hope in Northern Iraq," warns that leaders must recognize that peacekeeping is no job for amateurs.

In research for this study, junior and senior level practitioners agreed that it is highly advisable to have professional armies and National Guard-like units undertake and meet the challenges imposed by the new environment. Most of the current world conflicts assuredly demand military components with a lot of "heart (compassion) but no teeth (fire-combat power)." After all, peace operations are not designed to destroy or defeat tangible enemies as is conventional warfare. Peace operations are meant to address "conflicts." Conflicts, not people, become the enemy.

This new enemy could be manifested in famine (as in Somalia), in ethnic hatred (as in Zaire and the former Yugoslavia), border disputes (as in Ecuador and Peru), in chaotic dictatorship and rampant human right violations (as in Haiti), and in nation building and truce supervision (as in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala). Hence, political and military leaders should respond according to this modern and distinct stage of development. Therefore, hostile standing conventional armies massed in any given place in the world are no longer the main

threat; it is now all of the above-mentioned contingencies. No longer is a quick and decisive “Napoleonic” victory as valid as in the past. Mere combat equipment and skills are insufficient when confronting current, sometimes amorphous foes. Lessons learned suggest that in peace operations the military must gear their main efforts toward enabling warring factions to peacefully settle disputes in the diplomatic, social, and political arena. Here is where military forces with characteristics similar to the ones exhibited by the Venezuelan National Guard will be particularly valuable.

Interestingly, the majority of survey respondents agreed, in concurrence with several other authors, that these operations do not demand purely military skills; they also demand compassion, mature individuals, restraint, and “people” skills to interact with the local populace and cultures. Therefore, soldiers like the Russian Internal Troops, Venezuelan National Guard, and German Special Divisions fit the needs for engagements in complex missions such as peacekeeping. For example, Lieutenant Colonel H. J. Feldman (German Army) explained that since his country has a conscription system that lasts merely ten months, their soldiers are not as efficient as they should be for these kind of job. Hence, the German government opted for creating two division-strength units with voluntary professional soldiers to cope with peacekeeping challenges. The units Germany sent to Bosnia were composed of soldiers of these new units, thus giving better performance.

Indeed, it was found that organizations like the Venezuelan National Guard are quite valuable for peacekeeping endeavors. They not only have the military capability, but they also possess police-oriented skills, equipment, and training. They have flexible military structures that effectively accommodate law-enforcement tasks. These features become key when governments must deal with or mitigate current calamities. Many of the facts presented

throughout this study certainly demonstrate what could be the unique contributions these kinds of forces can bring to “the fight” and to what extent.

Now, to determine the potential assistance the Venezuelan Armed Forces could provide to future peacekeeping missions, it is agreed that the reality and current stage of Venezuela and its military makeup make it capable of playing an active part in any peacekeeping operation. Venezuela, however, will only participate in such multinational adventures if they are in its national geopolitical interests. Its apportionment would always be geared to the extent of available ground troops and combat support units. But, it may also provide field grade officers to be incorporated into joint operational and tactical planning cells. And, as has normally been done, military observers would be present in future Venezuelan PKO packages. Venezuela is also planning to add some technicians and civilian and military police.

The research showed that Venezuelan paratroopers attained excellent results in their peacekeeping experience in Nicaragua. However, it also showed the consensus calling for more experienced and mature professional troops when dealing with situations like those in Central America and in Haiti. Even though satisfied with the performance of its soldiers, the commanding officer of the Nicaraguan mission admitted that soldiers who possessed characteristics of the National Guard would have enhanced chances for success.

Countries like Russia, Canada, the US, and even Germany, addressing internal conflicts, restoring security elsewhere, and keeping warring factions separated while setting conditions for peace after civil wars, employed professional troops who performed tasks similar to those performed by the Venezuelan National Guard. We can get a better appreciation of this theory if we review the responses of the US and international officers who answered the survey. Question No. 15 asked, “Which type of soldier has better performance in peacekeeping missions?”⁶⁵ percent concurred with the thought that professional soldiers are the best choice. Some twenty-

five percent said “volunteers.” Ten percent selected “conscripts” but indicated that the conscripts should have sensible UN-like soldier and unit training. Therefore, 90 percent of the respondents considered that because of the unique environment surrounding PKOs, it is advisable to employ professional soldiers or volunteers (mature people).

Nations employing Venezuelan National Guard-like units in PKOs, include the Internal Troops of Russia; the US professional Army (active duty and reserve to include military police) and the US National Guard; Germany, which has created two division-size units of professional troops to address these new international military environment; and Venezuela, which is currently, though modestly, using National Guardsmen in Guatemala to conduct demining operations in the inner countryside’s conflict zones.

Venezuelan NG’s mission, organization, functions, training, and tradition makes it a capable and suitable military force to be deployed in peacekeeping missions. Its professional and mature individuals ensure a reliable source of manpower to carry out those duties now present in the evolving nature of peacekeeping. We must remember that these new enemies are to be addressed with both compassion and soldier skills. As noted throughout this study, new threats demand significant law enforcement duties, such as controlling public disturbances, providing internal security, escorting convoys, conducting checkpoints, supervising or securing elections, conducting civic actions, patrolling borders, conducting mine awareness programs, providing security for strategic installations, traffic control, combat in localities, and so forth.

The Venezuelan National Guard embraces those two attributes judged necessary for today’s peacekeeping forces: having military capabilities and providing police-oriented functions. The NG does not have to conduct hasty training for these tasks; but rather, they have been part of the institution since its creation more than half of a century ago. Thus, its personnel (soldiers and field grade officers) have grasped and mastered all of the above tasks as part of a

longstanding, institutional mission. Consequently, having attained such military and law-enforcement skills from the beginning, these guardsmen, as participants in a UN contingent, could provide highly trained and proficient military personnel and units to serve as observers, mediators, military police, combat forces, and command elements for multinational coalitions.

A significant finding validating this point is the fact that the survey shows that more than ninety percent of the common tasks that peacekeepers must perform includes practically the whole spectrum of military and law-enforcement duties that the National Guard of Venezuela perform on a day-to-day basis. Indeed, in so far as question No. 14 is concerned--"In your experience, what are the most common duties requested during peacekeeping missions?"--some ninety-eight percent agreed that the most common tasks are:

1. Military police.
2. Public order.
3. Weapon control.
4. Feeding starving people.
5. Border patrol.
6. Separating warring factions.
7. Traffic control.
8. Dealing with public disturbances.
9. Providing security and protection to food facilities.
10. Face-to-face meetings with local authorities.
11. Truce supervision.
12. Security to airfields and ports facilities and operations.
13. Joint patrolling.
14. Refugee control.

Consequently, if the Venezuela NG is committed to peacekeeping operations, there will be no impediment or hesitation to perform what is for the NG a normal duty.

If participating contingents require specific PK training emphasizing the lessons learned of other nation's previous experiences, they will also need training to perform in a multinational environment, to conduct multidimensional planning, to understand and adhere UN mandates, and to enhance soldier skills. The good news is that in Venezuela Guardsmen stay in the force for 30 years, so their experience remains valid much longer than in the case of conscripts whose stay in the military lasts just two years.

Recommendations

Given the demand for more international involvement in the search for diplomatic, military, economic, and other solutions to today's problems, and reviewing Venezuela's current conditions, this study concludes that the political and military leadership of Venezuela should be more engaged in international initiatives to promote peace and to help in humanitarian relief efforts. The national economic sacrifice associated with this role will have benefits, to include exposure to multinational diplomatic and military initiatives. In the diplomatic arena, political leaders would be able to project overseas the positive aspects of Venezuela's foreign policy. Enhanced participation would be a clear signal of Venezuela's interests in regional security matters, not only as a subject to receive support, but also as a key player upon which to rely. In other words, by participating in such a capacity, Venezuela would enhance its "prestige" and recognition as a nation, both regionally and worldwide.

In the military environment, Venezuela's leadership and lower echelons will receive the real flavor of how multinational operations are conducted. They would get acquainted with new military technology, weaponry, planning systems, work in a multinational environment, and so

forth. Being deployed on a more continuous basis, even if on a small scale, would give military units first-hand knowledge of how peace operations and humanitarian missions are developed as well as their strategic, operational, and tactical implications. Leaders would have reliable terms of reference to use to advise the National Command Authority in this regard and in other matters involving domestic issues. In the long run, the direct benefits of such exposure will assuredly enhance the nation which will further develop a well-trained and experienced military establishment that can be counted upon in any circumstances.

Undoubtedly, if Venezuela prosecutes any engagement in this capacity (peacekeeping as opposed to peace enforcement), National Guard detachments ought to be incorporated in the deploying military package. The VNG unique military structure and law enforcement functions, have overwhelmingly proved to be highly valuable in commitments of this kind. Even under Chapter VII UN mandates (such as in Bosnia and Haiti), follow-on peacekeeping forces were a paramount need for performing police duties, interfacing with locals, controlling public disturbances, controlling traffic, providing security, policing cities, and so on. National military establishments such as those in Germany, Russia, and US armies, and others have adopted this NG-like model to use when participating in peacekeeping operations. Therefore, organizations with characteristics resembling Venezuela's National Guard have been and will be essential to international military establishments when committed to promote peace and delivering humanitarian aid.

APPENDIX A

LITERATURE AND SOURCE REVIEW

The “school of thought” associated with the readings on peace operations indicated that overarching factors driving the new world order demands the utilization of more intensive peacekeeping endeavors. This thesis focused on the future requirements for peacekeeping operations and forces in the next millennium as well as on ascertaining what would be the contribution of the Venezuelan Armed Forces employing its National Guard.

This review of literature and sources identifies and assesses the material consulted in preparing this thesis. It incorporates historical and contemporary studies, articles and books, from diverse sources and nations. However, the study concentrates its attention to authors and policies of such countries as Canada, the US and Russia. Expert opinions in peace operations, especially peacekeeping, will be consulted. This survey of literature will be subdivided into four main areas each containing books, periodicals, government documents, interviews (telephone and personal) and other materials. These areas address: an overview of the new world order; peacekeeping doctrine and the current stage; police and approaches toward peacekeeping; and Venezuela’s potential contribution to future peacekeeping operations. Lastly, there will be a list of personal and telephone interviews as well as a list of conferences attended, and guest speakers.

An Overview of the New World Order

Books

There are many books that present information on the current socio-political and military world's situation as well as on the ongoing backlash and malaise spread out through the planet. Still other books illustrate the current issues in peacekeeping and the political position of various governments in this regard. Some of the books found significantly useful for the purpose of this thesis and particularly in putting together this chapter follow: Thakur, Ramesh' UN Peacekeeping in the New World Disorder: A Crisis of Expectations; Charters, A. Davis's Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Conflict Resolution; MacKenzie, Lewis' Peacekeeper: the Road to Sarajevo; Contreras-Laguado, Luis's LA Guardia Nacional y los Soldados de la Ley.

Government Documents

The White House's National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement, provides an excellent overview of the role the US intends to play in the world order; Boutros, Ghali's An Agenda for Peace states the UN Secretary General's appraisal of the order of thing occurring in the world and how he perceives the international community should deal with it; United Nations' UN Peacekeeping presents a good look at the organization of the UN Peacekeeping Department and a quick review to the history of peacekeeping and current peacekeeping operation (PKO) sites; US Army Field Manual 100-23, "Peace Operations," gives good insight into what peacekeeping is all about; US Army Military Review articles really go into the essence of what is new and happening in the world order and the implications for the US military establishment.

Periodicals

Like the books and some government documents, there are many articles that address key, topical in world issues such as civil wars, ethnic driven conflicts, border disputes, famine, refugees, social disparity, insurgency and terrorism. A quite interesting article, "Combining Vision and Reality in UN Peacekeeping Operations: A Closer Look at Europe," was written by R. F. Driscoll, in the publication of the National Defense University, entitled Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Coalition Warfare 1994. In this article, Mr. Driscoll defined the UN as the key organization providing meaningful leadership and experience to these kinds of endeavors. However, he warned about the internal problems underscoring the effectiveness of such operations. He suggested also that substantial changes are needed to improve procedures and rescue the credibility of the UN as the PKO main world player.

Christopher K. Haas presented a remarkable article, "The Supper MilGroup: A Model for Supporting Counterinsurgency in 2010," during the Second Annual Regional Strategy Studies Conference, entitled "Defense, Democracy, and Development: Challenges from a Regional Perspective," held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 14, 1997. In his paper, Haas delineates a successful approach applied by the US in dealing with the insurgency in El Salvador. He goes on and examines the root causes of antigovernment armed movements and makes predictions about the susceptibility of the reappearance of such phenomenon in the new world order.

There were several other magazines and newspaper articles that reviewed the theme of peacekeeping, world backlash and so forth. To illustrate the diversity of issues, in the Los Angeles Times of November 8, 1996, an editorial, titled, "We Must Not Dither on Zaire," depicted the horrible scenarios in Zaire and Rwanda and advised the US government to act cautiously. Bill Gertz, wrote in The Washington Times, of December 9, 1996, an article titled,

"Kiev Imperils U.S. Aid with Libya Arms Deal," in which he details an alleged arms deal between the governments of Ukraine and Libya that may jeopardize the good diplomatic relations and economic aid the US is providing to the Kiev government.

Peacekeeping Doctrine and Current Stage Books:

The Peacekeeper's Handbook 1994 provides excellent reference material to everyone working with peacekeeping operation issues. It examines the whole spectrum of how to plan, prepare, and conduct peacekeeping operations, as well as the training process to prepare potential individuals and contingents. Another excellent source was the book authored by Gerald Hensley, A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 90s. The UN authored Blue Helmets is and ought to be a required reading material to soldiers in the business of peacekeeping. It was really helpful.

The book Leadership in a Transnational World; the Challenge of Keeping the Peace, by Paul D. Miller, was significantly handy as so far as picturing a clear historical context of peacekeeping, the UN, and other related matters. And The Changing Shape of Peacekeeping, authored by Sahara Doyle and Kimberly Smith, gave a lot of meaning to the research.

Government Documents

The UN prepared a document called "Presentation to the Military Observer Community of a New Strategic Peace Operation Environment," which appeared in the UN publication, Welcome to the UN Situational Centre. This document provides an excellent source of information on the current capabilities and improvements of the UN in terms of peacekeeping planning and oversight efforts. The MOOTW Syllabus of the US Army Command and General Staff College, discusses several items relevant to the study at hand. The US Army Center for Lessons Learned edits a periodical titled, News From the Front, which contains after action

reviews (AAR) of major exercises and operations. Here were found important lessons that may make the difference in future the conduction peacekeeping operations.

Another instructive piece of official literature was a document containing Russian peacekeeping terminology, denominated, "Basic Terminology and Concepts in International Peacekeeping Operations: An Analytical Review". This document, written by Andrei Demurenko and translated by Robert R. Love, constitutes the terms of reference for the Russian Army to conduct actions in such capacity. This was particularly valuable since Russia is one of the analyzed nations (in this thesis). And the US Army, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, furnished considerable guidance in assembling the various pieces of this study. The US Army Field Manuals 22-100, Military Leadership and 100-5 Operations, truly contributed in answering some of the research questions.

Periodicals

David Last's article, "The Military Contribution to Conflict De-Escalation 1995," was a bedrock for identifying workable conflict resolution techniques to implement during actions tending to separate warring factions in a peacekeeping setting. David Moore and Bob Haskell wrote an article called, "Peacekeepers Return," published in Soldiers, October 1996. After coming back from Bosnia, the authors narrated what would be the implications of the media operating in the peacekeeping sites. An editorial of The Economist of September 9, 1995, entitled "The Real Lessons," gives its viewpoint of what have happen in Bosnia. Although not entirely objective, it is otherwise valid to the study. And, Raymond E Bell wrote a paper named "Somalia Revisited," published by the Armed Forces Journal International, March 1997. In this article the author highlights that a peacekeeping theater commander needs more freedom to act and react to events occurring in the his area of operation. He rejects the rather erratic command

and control from New York City, (UN Headquarters) of situations affecting an ongoing operation in Somalia.

Policy and Approaches Toward Peacekeeping

Government Documents

The document prepared by Mr. Timothy Thomas, of the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, entitled "Russian Internal Troops: Hot Spot Stabilizer Within Russia," certainly let us have a close look at the Russian armed forces and how committed they were to intervene in its near abroad nations. Another important piece of literature showing the Russian approach toward peacekeeping was "Using Force of Arms to Provide Domestic Security," written by V.A. Tsygankov.

A series of the Organization American States documents depicting the America's posture toward peacekeeping, helped in a great deal to understand the political interests and inclinations of the Latin American political leaders and military establishments. The Venezuelan National Guard 1996, presents an overall view of the organization with its goals and ends, thus becoming the main source of information insofar as showing and underpinning the internal organization and assets this force could offer as peacekeeper provider.

The National Military Strategy of the US contains the strategic military objectives visualized by the US Secretary of Defense in support of the National Security Strategy. Other documents were found, likewise useful to the completion of this essay: the UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations, January 1995, and the "JTF Haiti" published in the Special Warfare July 1994 edition.

Periodicals

There were numerous articles addressing peacekeeping and its current issues, that we had to carefully sort them out to narrow the scope and focus our search. Some of the chosen readings certainly beautifully articulated the updates of the subject at hand. For instance, we found interesting the articles authored by: Jeffrey Smith, "Peacekeeping in Bosnia," The Washington Post, November 18, 1996; Allison Mitchell, "Clinton Offers U.S. Troops to Help Refugees in Zaire," The New York Times, November 14, 1996; and the articles of Eduard A. Vorob'yev, "On Russia's Conceptual Approach to Peacekeeping," and Vladimir I. Krysenko, "Peacekeeping."

Venezuela's Potential Contribution to Future Peacekeeping Operations Using the National GuardBooks:

The Constitution of the Republic of Venezuela obviously serves as the landmark point of reference to find out how the nation intends to employ its armed forces. Thus, it was very useful to our project; The Venezuelan National Guard, authored by General Julio Cesar, Pena-Sanchez, a former Commandant, extensively details the mission, organization, and functions of this service and explains the extent of its immediate projects; in the book the Guardia Nacional de Venezuela, Hacia Una Especificidad Institucional, the current Commandant, General Luis Rincon-Viloria, goes to the genesis of the institution highlighting the significance it had in the past as a decisive political response and the role his institution has today, and how he perceives the greater weight the National Guard will have in the future development of the nation.

Government Documents

The Ejercito Venezolano: Ayer Exportamos Libertad Hoy Exportamos Paz, 1996, described the peacekeeping experience the Venezuelan Armed Forces attained during its

deployment in Central America (Nicaragua and Honduras); The "UN Informe Sobre la II Conferencia de Ministros de la Defensa de las Americas, 11 October 1996, provides meaningful information about the posture of the Latin American Military System regarding collective security and the implementation of regional measures to enhance confidence and trust among the members of the American System.

Periodicals

One of the most important source of information for this chapter stemmed from the letters and articles written by General Alvaro Barboza-Rodriguez (Venezuelan Army) about the United Nations Stand-By Force. Through his documents, General Barboza showed the intricate arrangements and agreements nations are working on to form such multinational military UN unit. He also presented the Venezuela's perspective regarding the stand-by force and reviewed other states' positions as well.

Interviews, Survey and Conferences

In order to obtain reliable and updated information about the research topic, individuals having first hand experience were targeted. Therefore, key political and military leaders were surveyed through various ways of contact; telephone and personal interviews, and attending speeches and conferences.

Telephone (T) and Personal (P) Interviews:

1. Minister Counselor, Ricardo Rodriguez, Vice President of Hemisphere Security Commission, OAS, Washington, DC., February and April 1997, (T/P).
2. Ambassador David Passage, Director of Andean Affairs, U.S. Department of State, March 1997 (P).

3. General (Venezuelan Army) Alvaro Barboza-Rodriguez, UN Military Advisor, UN HQ, New York City, NY., December 1996, January and February 1997, (T).
4. General (Venezuelan Army) Manuel Delgado-Gainza, Venezuelan Chief Mission, Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), December 1996, January and April 1997, (T/P).
5. General (Venezuelan National Guard, VNG) Orlando Hernandez-Villegas, VNG Delegate to the IADB, December 1996, January and April 1997, (T/P).
6. General (VAF) Boris Saavedra, Chief of Academic Affairs, Inter-American Defense College, Washington, DC., March 1997, (T).
7. LTC (Venezuelan Army) H, Mendez-Medina, Assistant to the Venezuelan Chairman of the Joint Chief Staff, Caracas, Venezuela, March 1997, (T).

Survey

A survey was administrated to the International Officers attending the 1996-97 CGSC Class (see enclosed list of nations).

Conferences Attended

1. Dr. William Perry, US Secretary of Defense, in occasion of being a guest speaker to CGSC students at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
2. General Raimer, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Guest speaker to the CGSC students at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
3. Ambassador David Passage, Director of Andean Affairs, US Department of State, Washington, DC.
4. Dr M. Cable, Military History Professor at the University of North Carolina, guest speaker to the CGSC students at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

5. Second Annual Regional Strategic Studies Conference Defense, Democracy and Development: Challenges and Opportunities from a Regional Perspective, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

APPENDIX B

SURVEY

PEACEKEEPING PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL OFFICERS ATTENDING RESIDENT CGSOC SURVEY

I am Major Hector Herrera, a CGSOC student assigned to Division B. This survey is part of my MMAS Thesis. Your time in completing this is greatly appreciated. Your responses will be tabulated with other responses and keep confidential. Please return this survey to my mailbox:

MAJ. Herrera (Venezuela)

1. Have you participated in a Peacekeeping mission? Please circle either YES or NO.
If you circled "YES" please continue and return this survey to: MAJ Herrera. Thank you!

2. Please identify your rank during your last Peacekeeping mission. (Circle only 1)

LT (01 or 02) CPT (03) MAJ (04) LTC (05) COL (06)

3. Please identify your native country: _____ Service _____ (CA)
(CS)____ (CSS)____

4. During your last Peacekeeping mission what UN Unit were you assigned to? (Please give the Country, City, Code Name of the Operations.)

5. What was your specific Peacekeeping mission?

6. After you received your Peacekeeping mission what type of special training in Peacekeeping did you receive BEFORE your deployment? (If you did NOT receive any training, please state "NONE.")

7. Did your original Peacekeeping mission change after you deployed? Please circle either YES or NO.

8. If you circled YES to number 7, how did your unit (leadership and soldiers) react to the change in mission?

9. Were there tensions resulting in the change to your mission?

10. Did you feel your unit was well trained to meet the challenge?

11. Identify the causes of tension and difficulty in conducting missions associated with societal issues. Check those which apply and explain briefly how.

a. Language:

b. Culture:

c. Custom:

d. Other (i.e., Politics, Geography, Religion, etc).:

12. Were the Host Nation's people friendly to the UN Forces? (YES), (NO). *(Circle Only One)*

If YES, how commanders coped with hostile situations?

13. Were the Rules f Engagements (ROE), clearly defined and understood? (YES) (NO). (Please check one and briefly explain).

14. In your experience, what are the most common duties requested by peacekeeping forces?

(check all that apply)

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Military Police | <input type="checkbox"/> Border Patrol |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Peace making | <input type="checkbox"/> Security of tactical or strategic facilities |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fly zone enforcement | <input type="checkbox"/> Medical support (personnel and supplies) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Controlling snipers | <input type="checkbox"/> Traffic control (roads and major highways) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Weapon control | <input type="checkbox"/> Public order |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Feeding starving people | <input type="checkbox"/> Security of routes |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Providing security to food or other goods directed to refugees | <input type="checkbox"/> Security of airfields |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Other: (Please describe) | <input type="checkbox"/> Security of major ports |

16. What do you think will be the extent of requirements for peacekeeping operations for the near and long-term future?

Thank you Very Much for your Cooperation !!!

APPENDIX C

LIST OF SURVEYED COUNTRIES REPRESENTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL
OFFICERS ATTENDING THE 1996-97 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF
COLLEGE CLASS.

Albania	France	Qatar
Argentina	Finland	Egypt
Australia	Germany	Saudi Arabia
Austria	Ghana	South Africa
Bahrain	Greece	Switzerland
Bangladesh	Guyana	Slovak Republic
Belarus	India	Thailand
Belgium	Italy	United Kingdom
Belize	Japan	Czech republic
Botswana	Jordan	Norway
Brazil	Kazakstan	Oman
Bulgaria	Kenya	Pakistan
Cambodia	Korea	El Salvador
Canada	Mexico	Jamaica
Croatia	Moldova	Namibia
Denmark	Papua New Guinea	Portugal

Djibouti	Phillipines	Hungary
Malaysia	Ecuador	Taiwan
Slovenia	Lithuania	Poland
Lebanon	Israel	Latvia
Turkey	Nepal	Netherlands
Mongolia	Malawi	Ukraine
Sri Lanka	Singapore	Romania
UAE	Georgia	Venezuela
United States		

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